Are you sure? At least, considering that almoat only A-50 Russia have - sovied made, with soviet datalink and systems overall…
anything can be upgraded.
also i believe they depend on DL updates from ground units like s400 more than AWACS, kinda their doctrine
You need money for that
Aswell as power
Sure A-50U exists… but only few of them
a bit of software upgrade to make it network centric doesnt cost much
Not software.
Hardware is also outdated a lot.
Also you need to pay workers
you still dont get the point, you just need to give the coordinates of the targets using DL to planes and missiles in the area
what kind of point is that? obviously they are paid.
Yes A-50 has been providing guidance for S-400 systems.
Russia have a pretty developed data link
It is not uncommon for pulse radars to have very high peak powers, with far lower average power. For example the British Red Steer radar (a relatively small radar with 20 nm max range, used for tail warning on the Vulcan bomber) had a peak power output of 130 kW, but doing some maths using the pulse width and PRF provided you arrive at an average power of only 130 W.
It is not hard to believe that far larger and more modern radars would be able to achieve 400 kW peak power. Heck the MiG-25’s radar is widely stated to have a peak power output of 600 kW.
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Updated the reserved post (#953) with the countour you wanted to check and other images.
Now, I was reading more material and found another eyebrow raising info from E. Riccioni. I’m copying the full text and the important part below. Anyhow, I also found that the USAF criteria for frontal sector is generally ±45 degrees horizontal and ±10 degrees vertical off from the nose. So the simulations we see out there are safe in this regard.
Full text
Spoiler
The F–22 PROGRAM: FACT VERSUS FICTION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY To “FACTORS FOR DECISIONS”
Everest E. Riccioni
Col. USAF, Ret.
For Project On Government Oversight
August 2000 - 1
THE DREAM — THE FICTION (This FICTION was provided to the Dept of Defense and the Congress by the USAF)
The Advanced Tactical Fighter, cum F-22, was to provide the USAF Air Superiority for the period following 2005.
Primary Mission—To Conduct Offensive Counter-Air Operations deep in Russia:
400 NM Combat Mission—100 NM subsonic cruise to the point of penetration, 300 NM supersonic ingress, substantial aerial combat, and 300 NM supersonic egress, with landing fuel reserves)
To provide 750 Aircraft to replace the aging F–15/F-16 Air Superiority Fleets
To be designed to a Unit Flyaway Cost Limit in 1982 dollars of $35 Million
Fact—An honest USAF Colonel stated in 1986—“Everyone knew it wasn’t a $35M aircraft.” Yet—the Commander of AFSC believed it could be done. (F-22 Study By ANSER, Inc. 24 March, 1988) The Congress and the Commander of ACC believed and expected what they were promised. All six competing contractors dutifully turned in proposals for the Advanced Tactical Fighter that allegedly weighed less than 50,000 lbs & allegedly cost less than $35M. The Fiction (distortion) was maintained throughout the prototype program.)
This cost is comparable to a Unit Program Cost of $50M in year 2000 dollars.
To control cost by conforming to a Weight Limit of 50,000 lbs
(With Cost and Weight comparable to the old F–15, the ATF/F-22 was clearly bargain)
Dominant Characteristics
Very High Stealth
Outstanding Supersonic Cruise Capability
Superlative Performance and Maneuverability
Superior Integrated Avionics for Battle Awareness and Effectiveness
Ancillary Aims
To Rejuvenate the Fighter Fleet (Reduce its average age)
Design for Low Maintenance (3 man-hours per sortie)
To Form a Hi-Lo Mix with the JSF Force
THE REALIZATION
Summary Conclusions— Impact of the F–22 on ACC and The USAF
The dreams of Stealth, Supercruise, Ultra-High Climb, Acceleration, and Maneuvering Performance have not been realized. The Outstanding Avionics will not be properly tested before purchase and possibly not even before combat.
The number of F–22s purchased will not provide a critical mass of fighters.
The “Dream” of 750 fighters initially promised for $40B and later for $70 Billion, fell to 648 F-22s for $64.2B after the 1992 SAR (Selective Acquistion Review), to 442 for $64.2B after the BUR (Bottom Up Review), and to 339 for $64.2B after a QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review. At 339 this is a unit program cost of $190M per aircraft—1/3 the cost of the B–1 (predicted in 1976), this cost is utterly obscene (The total program cost amortizes the research and development cost into the aircraft. It is always higher than the optimistic unit flay-away cost. It is the real cost to the public)
Thus, despite high funding levels, the future size of ACC will see further reductions.
The low number of F–22s will not rejuvenate the aging F–15, F–16 fleet. (A relentless result of the algebra of averages.)
A mix of F–22s and JSFs cannot be a High-Low Mix.
It will be An Ultra-High—High Mix of non-comparable, incompatible aircraft. The complementary F–15 and F–16 do both the air superiority and air-to-surface missions and can support each other. The F-22 does only day air superiority—the JSF will do only night bombing of static targets. Both have deserted our US Army (The US Army cannot rely on its helicopters to defend it in future ground operations.)
The few F–22s possessing quasi-F-15 performance will severely degrade the air superiority capability of ACC. Decision-makers have (again) opted for unilateral disarmament in the face of their perceived threats (The recent attempt of the USAF to purchase 135 B-2s for $40B resulted in 20 B-2s for $40B)
Most Significantly—
a) There is no aerial threat requiring a new air superiority aircraft.
b) There will be no air superiority threat. The future will bring anti-guerilla anti-terrorist, and anti-drug operations (wars), providing no role for an air superiority aircraft.
Validation of the Summary Conclusions
Stealth
The F–22 is not a Stealthy Aircraft.
Stealth means the proper suppression of all its important signatures—Visual, Radar, Infrared (IR), Electromagnetic Emissions, and today, even Sound.
Visual range — Since the F–22 is the world’s largest and very identifiable fighter, it will be seen first. Its role is in daylight. Stealth operations are night operations. Unfortunately design for radar stealth invariably increases the size of a fighter making it more visible, and hence is counterproductive.
The radar signature of the F-22 is improperly reported to the GAO and The Congress.
Only a single data number is provided to congressional committees and the GAO—the average radar signature in the level forward direction within 20 degrees off the nose, presumably to enemy fighter radars (In a B-1B report to the Congress, the signature was similarly malrepresented. A reported 100/1 radar signature advantage over the B-52 became a real 1.8/1, an advantage that proved to be of no importance). One cannot design an aircraft to hide from low and medium frequency ground radars and from high frequency airborne fighter radars, all of the time. Properly, radar signatures should be portrayed and reported for all aspects—all azimuths, and all “latitudes”—and for all radar frequencies. Single data suggest mendacity by incompleteness.
Fighters cruising supersonically are beacons in the sky to the various infrared sensors. Ramming the air at high speed and generating supersonic shock waves creates temperature differentials impossible to hide.
Fighters, with radar to search for and find enemy fighters autonomously, at long ranges, cannot hide their high powered electric emissions to modern, sophisticated, Russian equipment. The Russians excel at this art and export their equipment to many nations. Further, F-22 detection of enemies by radar is an inverse fourth power phenomenon, while detection of the F-22’s radar is an inverse square phenomenon, giving the advantage to the enemy.
The Sound Signature—Modernity and the sound of a booming supersonic F-22 allow high-speed computers to identify it and (given an integrated net of sensors) provide sufficiently accurate position location and prediction.
It is clear that designing air superiority aircraft for radar stealth
is a counterproductive error.
Supercruise
The F–22 has not yet demonstrated effective supersonic cruise, nor will it.
The USAF has never appreciated that speed without persistence is meaningless.
Proof—Six USAF aircraft capable of Mach 2.2 never exceeded 1.4 Mach in combat over North Vietnam in 10 years of combat, in hundreds of thousands of sorties. The F–15 has never demonstrated its performance guarantee of Mach 2.5 flight in a combat configuration on a realistic combat mission profile.
The USAF has the wrong definition of supercruise! Cruise means covering distance efficiently. Fighters, with wings properly sized for subsonic maneuvering achieve efficient supersonic flight at altitudes above 60,000 feet requiring partial afterburning thrust. The proper cruise condition may remain unknown to the testers since the test program currently limits testing to below 50,000. All supercruisers cruise at very high altitudes using some afterburning (i.e. ramjet) thrust—MiG–31, SR-71, and the many designs that I have studied, generated, or supervised (Detailed Aerodynamic-thermodynamic analysis is available)
The report that the F–22 has demonstrated supercruise is specious and misleading.
The report merely stated that the F–22 flew at 1.6-1.7 Mach flight speeds in pure turbojet (dry) thrust. The distance traveled and persistence at those speeds on its design mission were not provided. Supersonic speed at 1.6 Mach in dry thrust bodes well, but this capability is not sufficient to achieve supercruise. The need is to report the percentage of the dream mission accomplished (Care must be taken that the combat fuel not be used in supercruise to bias the test. Normally combat fuel reserves and landing fuel reserves consume half of the aircraft’s take-off fuel load. External tanks may not be employed).
The F-22’s Fuel Fraction is insufficient for pragmatic supersonic cruise missions.
Fuel Fraction, the weight of the fuel divided by the weight of the aircraft at take-off, impacts cruise-range, be it super or subsonic. At today’s state of the art, fuel fractions of 29 percent and below yield subcruisers; 33 percent provides a quasi–supercruiser; and 35 percent and above provides useful missions. The F–22’s fuel fraction is 29 percent equal to those of the subcruising F–4s, F–15s and the Russian MiG-21 Fishbed. The Russian medium range supersonic cruise interceptor, the MiG-31 Foxhound, has a fuel fraction of over 45 percent. Supersonic cruise fighters require higher fuel fractions since they must have excessive wing for effective subsonic maneuvering.
Proper data are global radius of action and global persistence plots as functions of speed and altitude, for rational missions. These data must be then compared to those of the F–15 and the ancient F–104 to establish progress. For example—the 40 year old F-104A-19 has twice the supersonic radius of the 20 year old F-15C at 1.7 Mach, and out-accelerates it at Mach 2.2. Compare! In comparison lies the proof of progress
Prediction—These comparison plots will never be shown to The Congress.
The “dream” 400 NM radius design mission was continually redefined and degraded to—a) conform to physically reality, and—b) to reduce the uncontrolled cost and weight. The goals have not been met.
Ultra-High Performance
The F–22 does not provide a Great Leap Forward in performance relative to the F–15C or MiG-29/Su-27.
At 65,000 lbs, with 18,500 – 18,750 lbs of fuel, with two nominal 35,000lb thrust engines—it has the thrust to weight ratio of the F–15C, the fuel fraction of the F–15C, and a wing loading that is only slightly inferior to that of the F–15C, so it will accelerate, climb, and maneuver much like the F–15C for reasons of basic physics (With quasi-F-15C performance, it cannot be labeled a ‘Silver Bullet’, whatever that term means to victory in war)
There are two differences from the F–15—thrust vectoring and supersonic speeds in dry thrust. The thrust vectoring being in only one dimension, does not augment slow speed maneuvering; it serves another purpose.
The flight test program to validate maneuverability is utterly inadequate. Using a single number—the maximum steady-state G at 30,000 ft at 0.9 Mach, for an aircraft that operates from stall speed to beyond Mach 2, from sea level to above 60,000 ft, is a throwback to the Dark Ages of aircraft evaluation (The USAF’s intent to use only a single point to measure the F-22’s maneuvering performance is cited in a General Accounting Office report). Proper presentations are global, all-altitude all-speed plots at the two major power settings. Further, they must be compared with friendly and enemy aircraft. Comparison reveals progress, the whole truth, and even allows the formulation of battle tactics.
Advanced Avionics
The expectations for the avionics are to provide great battle awareness and effective weapons management. The F-22 is to autonomously identify (ID) the enemy from friend, and from neutral, regardless of the country that produced the aircraft.
Such refined identification capability has never been achieved though frequently promised. Given failure and dependence on visual identification, the F-22 will be at the level of the F–15 and F–16. The inability to fulfill the requirement for visual ID made the USAF AIM-7D/E missiles, the long range Talos ship-to-air missile, the complex multi-mode long-range Phoenix missile, and Aegis missile cruisers relatively useless in combat.
But, testing will not be fully completed before going into production! The pressure is on to meet production schedules and to do incomplete testing to save time and money. Incomplete testing is fatal and extremely wasteful. B–1 avionics, similarly treated, still do not function in the aircraft after 2 decades, despite large transfusions of funds.
The software is more extensive and complex that that of the Aegis Missile cruiser.
Dependence on the integrated, complex system belies the dream of a low maintenance requirement.
Most likely result—The F-22 will be declared combat ready much before it is.
Relevance of Air Superiority
The relevance of air superiority in the modern world is vastly overstated.
The USAF has faced no significant air superiority force since the Korean War. Nor have our ground troops faced an enemy possessing an air-to-surface threat, since the Korean War.
Air superiority fighters are aimed primarily at enemy fighters—the irrelevant half of the modern problem (The USAF ATF program manager was determined that “not a pound was to be used for air-to-ground"). Our foreseeable enemies control the air over a battlefield with competent, relatively affordable, highly mobile Russian vehicles carrying surface-to-air missiles (IR, radar, and optically guided), and gun-missile systems (2S6 Tunguska/ SA-19 GRISON). They carry SA-8 GECKO, SA-11 GADFLY and SA-10 GRUMBLE missiles. Hence air-to-surface F-15Es, F–16s, and A-10s, become the de facto air superiority aircraft. Weak belated attempts to equip the F-22 to suppress enemy defenses are easily defeated by enemy tactics used by Vietnam and Serbia.
The USAF is already over-equipped to handle any imaginable air superiority problem.
Today, Air Combat Command (ACC) is capable of handling any coalition of air superiority threats. ACC has the most important factor—competent pilots, the second most important factor—large numbers (1,600-2,400 fighters), and the least important advantage—the best aircraft. In Germany during WW-II, US numbers, not quality, reigned supreme (After Germany opted for high technology in tanks and aircraft in lieu of numbers, they handily lost the war). The USAF has always had and has always depended upon superior numbers to win. Numbers saturate the enemy with problems and confusion. Only numbers can generate the intense operations demanded in war. Numerical advantage guarantees victory.
The US has no realistic future air superiority problem facing it.
A sane US will not initiate a war with India, China, or Russia. Nor will we war with France, England, Japan, and Germany. None of these nations will attack the US. Other countries are not threats. Nor will we war with our friends to whom we sold US aircraft (If US aircraft pose a threat, some decision-makers should be processed for incompetence or subversive intent). The US must minimize its enemies, not create them artificially to sustain the arms industry. Even gracious Canada has been listed as a possible threat! Yet, the US is already seeking foreign sales before our modern aircraft see service in the USAF and USN. (Examples— the USN’s F–18E, and the F–22)
The conjured need to cope with our weapons places our country in a self-perpetuating arms race with itself!
Money expended on the program will weaken ACC and the USAF in two ways—
By getting involved with an aircraft that has no function, and no relevance to modern wars.
By denying them funds they really need—for training and for a new aircraft to support a US Army, now completely stripped of supporting airpower.
Approximately 90 percent of the program funding can still be saved, and reprogrammed to relevant Air Force programs (Given the inability of the USAF to properly reallocate the funds, they can be transferred to the other services).
Alternative Action
Should a real air superiority problem present itself in the near future, there is time to design and develop an alternative, simpler, more affordable, high-performance, general-purpose, truly supersonic-cruise fighter fleet in large numbers, and field it before the F-22 is fully tested and made combat ready.
That it can be done was demonstrated by the lightweight fighter that transitioned from a dream in the conceiver’s mind to a production contract for the F-16A in 4.5 years.
An F-22 alternative has already been defined and designed. More and better alternatives are possible today.
This feat will require a revised and improved requirements/acquisition system (the F-16 was accomplished outside the formal system. Today the F-16 fleet outnumbers all other fighters by three to one, is the only USAF fighter of the 1970 era in production, and serves in at least four functions. It was the only new fighter that didn’t increase the cost exponentially. In fact it cut the price of its predecessor, the F-15 in half)
Important bit on RCS cherry-picking
Spoiler
The radar signature of the F-22 is improperly reported to the GAO and The Congress.
Only a single data number is provided to congressional committees and the GAO—the average radar signature in the level forward direction within 20 degrees off the nose, presumably to enemy fighter radars (In a B-1B report to the Congress, the signature was similarly malrepresented. A reported 100/1 radar signature advantage over the B-52 became a real 1.8/1, an advantage that proved to be of no importance). One cannot design an aircraft to hide from low and medium frequency ground radars and from high frequency airborne fighter radars, all of the time. Properly, radar signatures should be portrayed and reported for all aspects—all azimuths, and all “latitudes”—and for all radar frequencies. Single data suggest mendacity by incompleteness.
Riccioni had said in a later article that the Raptor RCS was the size of a bird (but only from the front, and against radars at co-altitude), and I think Stealthflanker mentioned some RAM that could reduce an overall 10db. So the absolute minimum there could lower to -32db or so. Still the frontal arc wouldn’t reach the bumblebee claim (-40 to -70db depending on source), especially with the ±45/±10 consideration.
On Bill Sweetman’s IDR there was an article on the Comanche project, saying RCS reduction would only matter if they could shave off 2 or 3 orders of magnitude from the helicopter (20-30db/100-1000x reduction), which still falls within the Stealth (1989) book citation that the ATF would shave off 1 or 2 orders in regards to the F15(A/C, presumably, since there was no E yet). There’s a lecture on YT saying the program managed a ~600x in RCS reduction in relation to the Apache, so -27.78db considering shape and everything, which matches the IDR article.
There are also claims that LM managed to develop a carbon nanotube material that would be both extremely absorbing (I’ve read 60db reduction) while also being a broadband RAM instead of especialized against a narrow radar band.
I’m also calling that as unsubstantiated. If a material could do that then shape wouldn’t be a worry for stealth anymore, coat any plane and it’ll outperform the F-22 simulations we’re looking at.
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And?
MnZn ferrite is one of the low grade RAM reaching -8dbsm levels. Better RAM can reach upto -20dbsm which was also mentioned in the 101 RCS simulations
Also, isn’t this value given already considering RAM?
It’s already becoming true, one of the good videos I’ve watched which explains it :- https://youtu.be/aJ7CuhNJxu8?si=O2DitUq20DjInzAr
All you need to do is coat anything fully, and hide stuff which can’t be coated (like weapons) while also preventing large flat surfaces like vhf antennas and make the tails slanted
what happened to stealth cruise missiles?
Supersonic or hypersonic missiles I meant
ddint A-12 series have some kind of coating? i think they can make RAM capable of dealing with high speeds
A-12 series used basic RAM (iirc simply iron ball paint). These have to be also rehauled and reapplied.
Putting these on a2a missiles will increase their weight and diminish their performance. Other than that these are a bit expensive but still not that much.but after a flight, one would have to rehaul these missiles again with ram coating which would be a lot of work. Better make internal weapons bay than this
you only fire a missile once though
Irl 99% of the flights, the missiles are brought back. Air to air combat is rare these days
Yeah, that was it. Hexaferrite for actual measured/known RAM, and better ones in the ‘may exist’ territory. IIRC he also considered honeycomb structured RAS on his KF21 simulation.
Also yes, when the numbers are given it’s for the final product or a simulated prediction, but even if we give an overall -20db all around, it would still not fall at the -40db for the overall frontal arc, as the sub -20db are very localized.
I mean, technically even we as common ppl have access to crazy RAM/RAS that is capable of reducing more than that, but they fall within the category of stuff that you can’t coat a plane with (pyramid RAM, Salisbury screens, etc.).
For the carbon nanotube stuff, it was back in JSF times.
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how exactly do you bring back a missile that has slammed into the ground or its targets?
You go for patrol
99% of time you don’t see enemy
You came back home with corroded ram which has to be rehauled
And if you use the f35 grade ram on missiles, the missiles may end up costing more than the target.