Which has no effect on IIR seekers that can detect the heat caused by friction of airflow and track targets based on shape.
Would have little to no effect on temperature, unless it acts as insulation. Still wouldn’t make a difference to any system beyond the late '90s.
Radar MANPADS when?
DIRCM is the only effective system I can think of in this respect, in which it works to varying degrees but is not a foolproof solution.
The sensitivity of those seekers versus a stealth aircraft is debatable.
It would effect MANPADs with radar seekers, or MANPADs with datalink?
How so?
No MANPADS have a radar seeker, with the only arguable “radar” systems being MANPADS attached to vehicles that utilized LOSBR or SACLOS control methods and radar detection, not tracking.
To reiterate in simpler terms, there are no radar guided MANPADS. Radar VLO features are irrelevant.
MANPADS with datalink do not use radar guidance, nor would any stealth feature affect them. They’re simply relayed information from an IRST host.
As in whether the MANPAD’s seekers can actually target a stealth aircraft.
The FIM-92K (vehicle datalink) exists, and non-MANPAD missiles (that only have MANPAD range, or are used at MANPAD ranges) do have radars and/or datalink capabilities.
Separately, I forgot to mention methods to reduce optical seeker effectiveness.
Again, how so?
What specifically makes the efficacy of locking a stealth aircraft with the likes of an IIR seeker “debatable”? All you’ve listed are radar-reductive measures, which are entirely irrelevant to the conversation.
The FIM-92K is a system that utilizes a dual-band seeker and datalink for IR feedback. Datalink =/= radar, radar reduction measures =/= untrackable by IR MANPADS.
Such as what? Name me one mechanized unit that doesn’t make use of a myriad of MANPADS systems or Strelas. Almost all frontline anti-air is via shoulder-launched IR missiles and IIR systems.
Which is why I’ve asked you 3 times to list such. You still haven’t done so…
As in whether MANPADs can do target a stealth aircraft even if it can’t target its exhaust.
That’s my bad on assuming the datalink must be from a radar, but I believe the LAV-AD would be able to get information from aircraft (or datalink-capable SPAA radars maybe?) and then send that information to the Stinger.
Not all, and in terms of short range air defense, the AGM-114L has a radar seeker.
Utilizing disruptive paints/coatings, mainly: both traditional camouflage and dazzle camouflage, or coatings with different reflectivity. The last one is a personal addition/hypothetical (since I’ve not heard of any plane officially using such a system), but I bet there’s a method of shaping or coating an aircraft so that it’s more prone to generate superior/inferior mirages.
IR missiles don’t target an aircraft’s exhaust…?
Do you think the aircraft itself emits no heat whatsoever? From the engines running at over 2000dg F to external accessories such as pitot tubes being heated to over 800dg F, even the airflow heating up the skin of the aircraft to ~200dg F… A missile will see it. Regardless of fancy shapes or insulation of internal structures, there is something to see.
The LAV does it purely by sight. Much like the actual 92K launcher, it has the capability of retaining a visual on an aircraft and that is what is communicated to the missile.
The AGM-114L isn’t used for short range air defense…?
Disruptive paints / coatings still don’t effect IIR seekers, nor does it effect UV output.
I think then all NATO planes that crashed for any reason, even due to a hurricane, should be included in Ukraine’s losses.
Well, F-22s are being fitted with the AIM-260 when it enters service later this year, so the missile advantage won’t last for long
But the temperatures they get up to might not be lockable (either the areas of high heat are too small or they are out of view for a ground-launched missile).
But it could be getting information from elsewhere: external radar → LAV-AD → FIM-92K
The M-SHORAD used them, at least until July (where they stopped due to wear concerns).
I was mentioning specifically optical countermeasures there.
The temperature of the aircraft in flight would not change because it uses LO geometry.
The temperature of the aircraft in flight also wouldn’t change because of RAM that’s less than 10cm thick.
It can and will still be locked by a missile.
Can you substantiate such?
The M-SHORAD never used Hellfires against aerial targets, it’s purely there for more armored components of a battlefield or anything softer that can use a bit of overkill.
Ever wondered what these are?
Optical countermeasures cannot fool a missile, though? Even IIR has fallbacks and bases its optical tracking purely off of thermal recognition of an aircraft.
If you had a RAM that thick, your plane wouldn’t go anywhere, wouldn’t even move.
I’m not talking of the entire aircraft, simply stating an upper limit as a possibility.
Even if 10cm thick, what difference would that make?
Do you have any idea how much RAM weighs that thick?
It takes about 100kg of paint to paint an Mi-8 helicopter.
Who cares about how much it weighs?
Are you insane? Such a RAM coating will weigh 3-4 tonnes, what kind of idiot would go for that?
Again, who cares?
The plane makers, because they won’t put an extra 4 tonnes on the plane.
And your anality of paint weight pertains to my hypothetical… how?
I’m asking you the same question 3 times in a row… It really isn’t hard to answer.
