But to the money wasting topic, you should maybe consider to do a quick research… why gaijin is making less money, in not only wt, but on all of their games… what their sales strategy is, compared to wot…what is different about it and why people dont spend nearly as much money on gaijins games… i give you a hint, its called “trust”.
edit3* for only people who cares, i made a llm promt, result is in the spoiler.
Spoiler
Prompt:
world of tanks and warthunder are competitors as you know, do a bit of reasearch, history, selling tactics and so on, why gaijin is making so much less money then world of tanks and always has been? Why are the players not spending more in gaijin games, especially in wt?
LLM:
My read: World of Tanks established a huge paying audience earlier, and its sales system gives established players more reasons to keep buying. War Thunder can make a purchase feel like buying faster progress without resolving the frustration that prompted it. That is a plausible explanation for weaker spending—but the claim that Gaijin has always made much less, especially per player, is stronger than the public evidence supports.
Here’s what the research shows, followed by my interpretation.
First, the financial comparison needs some care.
| Available evidence |
What it tells us |
| SuperData estimated World of Tanks revenue at just over $500 million in 2014 . |
WoT was already an enormous business. This was an external estimate, not an audited game revenue disclosure. |
| Preqin’s Gaijin Games Kft. profile reports approximately $151 million revenue for 2023 . |
One Gaijin entity has substantial revenue; this does not establish consolidated Gaijin revenue or WT revenue alone. |
| Wargaming transferred its Russia/Belarus operations to independent Lesta management in 2022 . |
Historical worldwide WoT figures cannot simply be treated as today’s Wargaming business. |
These figures concern different years and business boundaries, so dividing them would produce a misleading “revenue gap.” Revenue also isn’t profit. dev.by
More fundamentally:
Revenue = active players × percentage paying × average spending per paying player.
Lower total revenue does not necessarily mean individual players are less willing to spend.
1. WoT had a major head start where it mattered: building tank players’ habits.
WoT launched in Russia in 2010 and Europe in April 2011. War Thunder’s tanks only entered open beta in May 2014. By then, WoT already had years to establish itself as people’s regular tank game. World of Tanks
The commercial consequence is cumulative: friends, account progression, familiar mechanics, and collections make switching costly even when another game offers attractive features. Early revenue also finances further acquisition. Wargaming’s CEO explicitly described reinvesting in new markets, operations, PR, and marketing in a 2012 interview. GamesBeat
My inference is that a large part of the historical gap was audience scale and accumulated loyalty , rather than Gaijin failing to find a clever enough shop tactic.
2. WoT really did show unusually strong willingness to pay—but WT’s numbers are not disastrous.
In 2012, Wargaming’s CEO said approximately 25–30% of players paid. In May 2023, Gaijin said approximately 80% had never paid , implying roughly 20% had paid at some point. GamesBeat
Those are different dates and insufficiently defined populations, so they are not a controlled comparison. Nevertheless, they do not support the idea that WoT players overwhelmingly pay while WT players almost never do.
Separately, SuperData’s 2014 analysis estimated WoT at $4.51 monthly revenue per active user , unusually high among the free-to-play titles compared. I did not find a reliable equivalent WT figure for a matching period. GameWatcher
I would also be cautious about the familiar “WoT has wealthy older players; WT has broke teenagers” explanation. It is plausible that demographics matter, but I found no satisfactory comparative age-and-income dataset proving it.
3. Wargaming packages spending into occasions, collections, and apparent bargains.
Consider the difference in these documented offers:
| Sales mechanism |
Example |
Likely psychological effect—my interpretation |
| Guaranteed value plus a random prize |
WoT Holiday Ops boxes combine guaranteed gold with chances at premium vehicles and cosmetics. |
Players can justify the purchase as buying useful currency while chasing an exciting extra. |
| A guaranteed reward after enough attempts |
Holiday Ops 2024 guaranteed a high-tier premium on the 50th box if none had appeared in the preceding 49. |
Progress toward a guarantee encourages additional purchases. |
| Limited availability |
WoT’s Assembly Shop offers limited quantities of vehicles for accumulated resources. |
Scarcity creates urgency and gives veterans another reason to consume their stockpiles. |
| Large discounts |
WT’s 2024 anniversary offered 50% discounts on specified premium-account durations. |
Strong conversion opportunity, but also a reason to postpone purchases until sales. |
These mechanics are documented in the respective publishers’ announcements. worldoftanks.eu
WoT’s strength here is turning buying into a recurring event. Someone who already owns an effective credit earner can still want another collectible, a limited vehicle, or holiday rewards.
WT also has collectors, events, and scarcity. The distinction is one of emphasis, not an exclusive feature. And holiday boxes cannot explain WoT’s entire historical advantage: it was already monetizing strongly in 2012.
4. WT’s progression purchases can reach a point of diminishing usefulness.
Gaijin explicitly describes progression acceleration as a foundation of its monetization. Premium accounts increase earnings; premium vehicles provide another progression tool. War Thunder
My interpretation: a player primarily buying efficiency can reach “enough” fairly quickly:
“I have premium time and a vehicle that grinds the nation I want. What does another purchase really solve?”
There are reasons to buy more—other nations, vehicle types, collecting—but every additional purchase competes for the same limited playing time.
This affects WoT too. The commercial challenge is persuading players who have already solved their economic needs to keep spending. Collectibility and sales occasions help do that.
5. Spending in WT does not necessarily deliver the experience the customer hoped to buy.
This is, to me, the most important product-design explanation, although public data does not quantify its revenue impact.
A player may want an enjoyable modern-tank or jet experience. Buying faster access does not automatically provide the knowledge, supporting vehicles, or competence to enjoy it.
That creates several possible reactions:
- Before buying: “This is expensive, and I’m unsure I’ll enjoy it.”
- After buying: “I paid, but I’m still struggling.”
- Before buying again: “Another vehicle probably won’t fix my problem.”
In ground modes involving multiple spawns, the usefulness of a purchased vehicle also depends on what else the player can field. That can encourage buying a lineup, but it can equally make the initial purchase feel incomplete.
A purchase that reduces grind is not necessarily a purchase that increases enjoyment enough to generate the next sale. Both games face this problem; I suspect it is particularly consequential for WT’s more demanding combat experience.
6. Economic pressure can produce purchases—or refusal.
Wargaming’s own CEO described high-tier repair costs as a monetization mechanism back in 2012: players could spend or play profitable lower-tier battles to fund them. So selling relief from economic friction is certainly not unique to Gaijin. GamesBeat
But the balance matters. WT’s May 2023 economy changes were reverted, and Gaijin subsequently published a substantial economy-revision roadmap addressing player feedback. That demonstrates a real breakdown in acceptance of the economy; it does not, by itself, prove a revenue decline. War Thunder
My commercial interpretation is that excessive pressure can change the customer’s attitude from “I’ll pay to improve a hobby I enjoy” to “I resent paying to remove an obstacle.” Some still spend. Others stop spending while continuing to play, wait for discounts, or leave.
So why aren’t WT players spending more? The evidence does not show one universal refusal to pay. More likely, different groups hit different limits: some are satisfied playing free, some have already bought enough progression help, some wait for sales, and some doubt another purchase will improve their experience.
My strongest conclusion is that WoT’s historical advantage combines early audience scale with effective repeat-purchase merchandising. WT’s likely weakness is the gap between the progress it sells and the enjoyment a buyer expects. Establishing how much each factor explains would require comparable active-player, payer-conversion, repeat-purchase, and spending data that neither company publicly supplies in sufficient detail.
Pormt:
You think the peoples paying behaviour could have smt to do with the way the amount of people trust the devs? wot has a history of refunding if they change a premium, wt has the opposite, a history of changing almost every vehicle that they ever placed to be sold
LLM:
Yes. Confidence that a purchase will retain its usefulness could be a significant driver of repeat spending—and my earlier answer gave that too little weight. That is more specific than simply liking or disliking the developers.
Your comparison has a documented basis, although I would qualify its scope:
- WoT has offered compensation for premium changes. When changing the SuperPershing, Wargaming offered existing owners its full retail value of 7,200 gold . That was an in-game currency refund, not cash, but it let customers choose another purchase. This establishes a precedent, rather than a guarantee for every change. World of Tanks
- Gaijin’s published store FAQ takes a much stricter position: it describes virtual-item purchases as non-refundable, with exceptions for technical payment problems. It offers no general assurance of compensation for balance changes. That is its stated commercial policy, rather than a conclusion about anyone’s legal rights. store.gaijin.net
I wouldn’t repeat “almost every vehicle” as an established fact without checking the vehicle histories. But your underlying point does not require that claim to be true.
Players buy an expected experience, not merely a vehicle model. They may choose a premium because it fits a particular lineup, faces particular opponents, has a distinctive weapon, or earns enough to support their preferred way of playing. A change can undermine that purchase even if the vehicle remains statistically competitive.
For example, hypothetically: you buy a tank specifically to complete your favourite lineup. Its battle rating increases, and keeping it in that lineup now changes the opposition for everything else. “It still has a good win rate” does not answer your complaint: the reason you bought it has disappeared.
That can affect spending in several ways:
| Customer expectation |
Likely purchasing response |
| “If they substantially change it, they’ll give me a reasonable exit.” |
More confidence buying at full price. |
| “It could change, and I bear the entire loss.” |
Wait for discounts or skip the purchase. |
| “My last purchase stopped doing what I bought it for.” |
Become reluctant to buy the next vehicle. |
| “New vehicles might be changed once enough people buy them.” |
Distrust launch offers—even without evidence of deliberate manipulation. |
These are plausible mechanisms, not measured findings about the size of WT’s revenue loss .
The particularly damaging effect is that one disappointing purchase can reduce confidence in the entire catalogue . A player stops asking only “Is this tank worth €60?” and starts asking “Will the next €60 purchase disappoint me too?” They can continue enjoying the game while deciding never to spend again. Player retention can therefore conceal lost paying customers.
Compensation also has a commercial benefit beyond settling one complaint. A gold refund keeps the money within Wargaming’s economy while letting the player recover purchasing choice. It can preserve the next transaction instead of defending the previous one at all costs.
There is a genuine balance problem here: permanently protecting paid vehicles from necessary nerfs can hurt everyone else’s experience. The stronger trust-building promise is “we will treat you fairly when we materially change your purchase.” That leaves room for balancing, with exchanges or compensation where appropriate.
So I would revise my earlier assessment: trust in the lasting value of premium purchases belongs among the leading explanations worth investigating for differences in repeat spending. We cannot establish that it explains the overall revenue gap, but your proposed mechanism is concrete and commercially persuasive.
promt:
so gimme a summary, also double check if you may find more about it
LLM:
Yes—trust is a credible part of the explanation, especially for repeat purchases. The additional research supports your argument, but also shows that “Wargaming always compensates, Gaijin never does” is too absolute.
Here’s the summary of our discussion:
- WoT’s historical advantage started with scale and timing. It established its tank audience several years before WT’s ground forces launched. That gave it more time to build paying habits, collections, and social connections. worldoftanks.eu
- Wargaming creates recurring reasons to spend. Holiday boxes, guaranteed rewards, and limited-quantity vehicles encourage purchases even after players have enough premium vehicles to grind comfortably. These mechanisms are documented; their precise contribution to the revenue gap is not. worldoftanks.eu
- Trust can affect what players consider a premium worth. If customers expect a purchase to remain useful—or receive a reasonable remedy if it changes—they have less reason to delay, demand a discount, or stop buying.
- WT can lose spending without losing the player. Someone can still enjoy the combat while deciding that another expensive premium is too uncertain. That is a plausible commercial mechanism, not a measured finding about WT’s revenue.
The extra checking uncovered useful evidence on both sides:
| Example |
What it establishes |
| WoT SuperPershing changes: owners were offered its full retail value of 7,200 gold . |
A concrete precedent for giving customers an exit after changing a premium. It was gold, not cash. |
| WoT Panther 8.8 price reduction: Wargaming offered compensation for the price difference and a full-refund option. |
Another example of protecting existing buyers, although this concerned pricing rather than a nerf. |
| WT’s 2023 premium-rank changes: Gaijin explicitly said it generally avoided changing premium/event ranks because that could affect research usefulness; this revision would only raise them. |
Gaijin does recognize the importance of preserving some purchased benefits. |
| WT’s June 2025 removal of accidentally available camouflages: Gaijin announced Golden Eagle refunds. |
“Gaijin never compensates” is incorrect—but this does not establish compensation for premium vehicle balance changes. |
These examples come from publisher announcements. worldoftanks.com
Gaijin’s published store FAQ still describes purchases as generally non-refundable, and I found no general premium-vehicle refund or exchange promise covering balance changes . Equally, the Wargaming examples do not establish an unconditional refund guarantee. store.gaijin.net
The strongest version of your argument is this: when a premium’s characteristics, opponents, or lineup role can change without a satisfactory remedy, customers may place a lower value on every future purchase . One disappointing transaction can therefore cost several later sales. Whether the change was justified for game balance is a separate question from whether the buyer feels fairly treated.
My revised assessment is that purchase security deserves more weight than I initially gave it . It plausibly helps explain differences in repeat spending alongside audience size, sales tactics, and perceived value. But public data still does not prove that WT players spend less per person today, or how much of any gap comes from distrust.
Promt:
what they say is not always what they do, on both sides. Check for whats happening in reality.
Also gimme a summary of your findings why wot earns so much more: Also give an overview of where you found informations, how sure you are of them, how much you thing your findigs are accurate. Theres some reason why they may multiple times more, if you also cant say realtively sure why, then tell that to me
LLM:
I can give you a reasonably supported explanation of WoT’s historical advantage. I cannot confidently establish that it currently earns several times more than WT, or that distrust of Gaijin explains most of the difference. My earlier answers were too confident about the causes before establishing a comparable revenue gap.
The extra research produced one important correction and some stronger evidence about actual developer behaviour.
1. The best direct spending comparison I found shows a 38% difference—not several times more.
SuperData’s estimates for the year ending March 2014 put average monthly revenue per active user at:
| Game |
Monthly revenue per active user |
| World of Tanks |
$4.51 |
| War Thunder |
$3.26 |
| WoT advantage |
About 38% |
Both figures appear in contemporary GamesBeat and MMORPG.com coverage. I missed the WT figure earlier. These are estimates from the same underlying research , so the two articles are corroboration of what was reported, not independent measurements. MMORPG.com also explicitly questioned the transparency of the underlying data. Confidence: medium in the estimates; high that they were reported accurately. GamesBeat
That changes the interpretation considerably: WT was already monetizing fairly strongly per player. If total revenue was several times lower in that period, audience size had to explain much of the difference.
For illustration—not an estimate of their actual audiences—three times as many active players spending 1.38 times as much produces 4.14 times the revenue . No single dramatic difference in customer psychology is required.
2. There is evidence that Wargaming protected premium purchases in practice.
The strongest additional example is the Progetto 46 in update 1.10 :
- Removing gun rammers would have reduced its performance.
- Its base shell-loading times were subsequently reduced from 8/9/12 seconds to 7.2/8.1/10.8 seconds .
- That change appears in the release notes and in the independent Skill4ltu vehicle-history database.
- Contemporary players discussed—and criticized—the resulting protection/buff of the premium.
This goes beyond a general promise: there is a recorded vehicle change and outside corroboration. Confidence: high for this example. docs
The SuperPershing gold-refund precedent also has community corroboration, although I did not obtain transaction records proving individual payouts. I would describe that as a well-supported historical precedent , not evidence that every dissatisfied customer receives compensation. World of Tanks
3. There is evidence of WT changes damaging customers’ willingness to spend—but its scale is unknown.
For example, the October 2023 M735 ammunition change appears in the released patch notes. Contemporary players reported reduced penetration, and a purchase-advice discussion explicitly cited the Type 16 FPS’s ammunition as a reason against buying it. That connects a real change with a stated purchasing objection. War Thunder
In a separate F-5C discussion, a player explicitly said previous changes to their T-34-100 had caused them to stop spending, and that the F-5C experience undermined confidence again. Other participants disputed whether the F-5C change made its situation materially worse. That is evidence of expressed distrust, not proof that every complaint accurately describes the balance change—or that the reported spending history is verifiable. War Thunder — official forum
My confidence is medium that this affects some customers; low about how much revenue it costs overall . Complaint threads disproportionately attract dissatisfied players, and searching specifically for spending complaints compounds that selection bias.
4. Wargaming’s protection does not mean purchases retain their practical value forever.
WoT players also report older premiums becoming less useful as stronger competitors arrive. That matters: a developer can leave your tank’s statistics untouched while changing its competitive environment enough to make the purchase disappointing. These reports undermine any simple claim that WoT customers uniformly trust Wargaming. reddit.com
My assessment of why WoT historically earned more:
| Explanation |
My assessment |
Confidence in its contribution |
| Larger established audience |
Strongest explanation for a multiple-fold historical gap. WoT had years to establish its tank audience before WT ground forces arrived. |
Medium–high , historically |
| Higher spending per active player |
Supported by the 2014 comparison: approximately 38% higher. Cannot extrapolate that figure to today. |
Medium , for that period |
| Recurring sales, scarcity and collection incentives |
WoT’s holiday boxes and limited offers provide repeated reasons to buy. Their existence is clear; their incremental revenue effect is not public. |
Medium as a contributor |
| Confidence in premium-purchase protection |
Concrete examples support the distinction you raised. Likely matters to repeat buyers. |
Medium for the mechanism; low for explaining the total gap |
| WT frustration despite paying |
Player reports support it for some customers, but I lack representative comparative evidence. |
Low–medium |
| WoT players being older or richer |
I did not find adequate comparative demographic evidence. |
Low |
The launch chronology and sales mechanisms are documented, but their ranking above is my interpretation. worldoftanks.eu
How reliable is the research overall?
- Released patch notes plus independent vehicle histories: strongest evidence for what actually changed.
- Contemporary industry reporting: useful for historical financial estimates, with methodological uncertainty.
- Forums and Reddit: useful for identifying experiences and possible mechanisms; weak for measuring prevalence or spending.
- Company statements and policies: establish promises and stated intentions, not consistent execution.
- Gaijin entity-level financial profiles: insufficient for comparing consolidated companies or individual games. The 2022 Wargaming/Lesta separation further complicates comparisons across years. www.preqin.com
Your trust explanation survives the checking, but it is not established as the main cause. The most defensible historical explanation is a much larger audience combined with somewhat stronger monetization per player . I cannot relatively confidently explain a current several-times revenue gap because I have not verified that gap on a same-year, same-product, same-region basis. Assigning percentages of it to trust, pricing, or marketing would be inventing precision.
promt:
did you compare revenue from the same year? wargaming has multiple times more income overall, is it because of their other games? what about gaijin other games?
LLM:
No—not for the total-revenue figures. I compared WoT’s estimated 2014 revenue with a Gaijin entity’s 2023 revenue. That mixed years, games and company boundaries, so it cannot establish a revenue multiple. That was my mistake. The 2014 spending-per-player comparison was from the same period.
And yes: Wargaming’s other games are a material part of the answer. Company revenue cannot be treated as World of Tanks PC revenue.
| Business |
Wargaming |
Gaijin |
| Main game discussed here |
World of Tanks PC |
War Thunder PC/console |
| Separate tank/mobile products |
World of Tanks Blitz; World of Tanks Modern Armor |
War Thunder Mobile |
| Other games |
World of Warships; Warships: Legends; Warships Blitz; World of Warplanes |
Crossout; Crossout Mobile; Enlisted; Star Conflict; CRSED |
| Publishing partnerships |
Additional publishing activities |
Includes Modern Warships through its Artstorm partnership |
These are distinct products and commercial relationships, not necessarily revenues that all flow to the publisher on identical terms. The companies’ game catalogues and partnership announcements establish the portfolios. Wargaming
The clearest evidence that Wargaming’s other products matter is Blitz. Its studio head told GamesBeat in June 2024 that it had exceeded $1 billion in lifetime revenue over ten years . That is substantial business outside WoT PC. It is a management disclosure, not independently audited evidence, and it does not mean Blitz earned $1 billion in 2024—or exactly $100 million that year. Thaine Lyman interview - GamesBeat
For a broader scale check, Wargaming’s CEO described its Russia/Belarus exit as removing approximately one-third of revenue, or $250 million , in a 2023 interview. That implies a roughly $750 million pre-exit revenue base , using rounded management figures. It is not a verified 2023 or current annual revenue total. Victor Kislyi interview - GamesBeat
What about Gaijin’s other games? They must also be included in a group comparison. But I have not found a credible public annual revenue breakdown for Crossout, Enlisted, WT Mobile and the other titles. Gaijin calls WT its main project, which supports its importance but does not tell us whether it contributes 50%, 75% or 90% of revenue. Gaijin Entertainment
There are two important accounting problems:
- Gaijin Games Kft. is one legal entity. Its reported revenue cannot automatically be labelled either “all Gaijin revenue” or “War Thunder revenue.”
- Publishing a game does not establish entitlement to all its sales. Modern Warships is an Artstorm partnership; I do not have the revenue-sharing terms. Adding its entire consumer spending to Gaijin’s revenue would be unjustified. www.preqin.com
My corrected conclusion:
| Question |
What I can confidently say |
| Do other games materially increase Wargaming’s revenue beyond WoT PC? |
Yes. Blitz alone demonstrates that. |
| Does Gaijin also earn money beyond WT? |
Yes , but I cannot quantify the contribution reliably. |
| Do other games explain most of a several-times company revenue gap? |
Not established. We need comparable consolidated totals and game breakdowns. |
| Does a larger Wargaming total prove WoT players spend much more than WT players? |
No. It combines different games, audiences and platforms. |
We moved too quickly from “Wargaming is a bigger business” to “WT players are less willing to pay.” Portfolio size and audience size need to be accounted for first. Trust remains a plausible influence on individual purchasing, but the financial evidence we have does not identify it as the principal explanation for the companies’ size difference.
promt:
so gimme again a short conclusion so far
llm:
Wargaming’s larger revenue does not, by itself, mean War Thunder players are less willing to spend.
- Scale and other games matter: Wargaming earns from WoT PC, Blitz, console Tanks, and its Warships games. Gaijin also has other games, but we lack reliable revenue breakdowns.
- Our only comparable historical spending estimate: in 2014, WoT earned about 38% more per active player than WT—not several times more. It cannot establish today’s difference.
- Trust plausibly affects repeat purchases: there are concrete examples of Wargaming protecting premium purchases and WT players reporting that changes discouraged spending. We cannot measure the overall financial effect.
- I have not verified a current, same-year company revenue multiple. My initial comparison mixed years and business boundaries.
My best-supported explanation is audience scale plus the game portfolio, with monetization and purchase confidence as possible additional factors. I cannot confidently say how much each explains.
Me again:
So no one really knows, even chatgpt cant find enough evidence and gets confused.