You admitted that for the 5 prototypes, the Heavy Armor hull contains DU.
You admitted the CBO says the AIM fleet received Heavy Armor in the hull.
So your argument is that the Army uses the specific term Heavy Armor to mean DU for the prototypes, but uses the exact same term to mean Non-DU for the fleet, and the CBO just went along with it.
That is the definition of creating ambiguity where none exists.
You are forcing the CBO to use a deceptive double-definition just to keep your theory alive. If the AIM fleet hull was non-DU, the CBO would have called it Composite like they did for the IPM1. They called it Heavy Armor because it matches the DU definition established by the prototypes.
Also, regarding your crate analogy:
Item 9 doesn’t license the crate. It licenses the component.
It authorizes the use of DU material utilized as Armor in tank turrets and hulls.
It explicitly defines the Hull as a utilization point for the material. If the hull was just a cold box next to a hot turret, the NRC would not list it as a utilization point. They listed it because the uranium is inside it.
Your entire argument rests on the assumption that the Army maintains a massive conspiracy of identical names for different materials to trick federal auditors.
Yes it is speculation but when you factor in the fact the US from 1986 to 2000 had anywhere from 5000+ M1A1s in service with an average age of 14 years do you honestly think with the AIM program that they would magically refresh every M1A1 to M1A1 AIMs with DU hull and turret armour? I really dont think you grasp the sheer monetary value involved let alone the the amount of DU needed to do this WHILE still producing M1A2s and M1A2 SEPs which would also have been using DU supply chains.
Which brings me to my other point, why would the US siphon DU supply to an M1A1 upgrade program when they HAVE M1A2s and M1A2 SEPs using Gen 2 and Gen 3 DU armour. its not something you can simply ignore even if speculation because reality is, thats expensive and if supply is limited in the DU supply chain department well I would expect them to prioritise M1A2 variants and beyond and not a refresh program of sorts.
HA armour could just have meant a more denser composite array or DU, we simply dont have enough information to confirm as such but WHAT we do know is and you conveniently ignore the timelines.
Why would the AIM which came into service in 2000, 9 years after the M1A2 and 1 year after the MA12 SEP still list HA for its armour when in that span of 9 years prior DU armour was already in full blown use in the M1A2s. You also should look into the AIMs that got sold to Australia because they too conveniently debunk DU being in all Abrams and even confirm the AIM they acquired used a special composite of some sort.
See the paragraph at the bottom where they state “The Australian tanks have not had depleted uranium fitted to them in the past. Instead, during rebuild they will be fitted with an advanced non-DU armour.” The fact they make a dinstinction here relative to past tense implies DU was never fitted during the rebuild which is what AIMs are, they are rebuilt M1A1s (like new)
Granted the likely hood that the exported AIMs would have got DU to begin with is questionable but tis the fact even the Australian defence talk about how during rebuild it wasnt being fitted with DU, now that could potentially be specific to the Australian export agreement but I doubt the US would have 2 production lines for there AIMs, again it would be financially cheaper and easier if they simply produced the AIMs with some composite array or denser array that isnt DU to make exporting easier
The fact that the General Dynamics license only mentions turrets is irrelevant. The Federal Register explicitly states in Section 2, Paragraph C that the DU is fabricated into armor packages by a contractor to the Department of Energy and then shipped to the plant for installation.
General Dynamics is just the installer. Their handling license covers their specific work at the plant, but it is not a complete inventory of the tank’s contents.
The only document that accounts for the final configuration of the vehicle is the Army’s own possession license, SUB-1536. The Army is the owner of the fleet and is legally required to list every radioactive component they possess. That license explicitly defines hulls as depleted uranium armor components.
Using a contractor’s handling permit to override the Army’s actual legal declaration of what its tanks contain is a deflection. The Army license says hulls, the CBO says hulls, and the Federal Register defines the system as radioactive. A manufacturer’s license for handling turret modules doesn’t change the fact that the Army is licensed for DU in the hulls.
Citing the Australian export contract proves the opposite of what is being argued. It is a matter of federal law under ITAR that the U.S. cannot export Special Armor (DU). The U.S. is legally required to maintain a separate armor configuration for export customers. Australia’s public confirmation that their tanks lack DU is a result of those export restrictions, not a reflection of the U.S. domestic inventory.
Speculating that the U.S. would cut costs by skipping DU on its own tanks is also factually wrong. DU is a waste byproduct of the enrichment process. The U.S. has a massive surplus of it that is essentially free to use, making it cheaper than developing and sourcing high-performance non-DU ceramic composites for thousands of tanks.
The distinction in the CBO table remains the key evidence. The CBO labeled the IPM1 as having Improved Composite. They labeled the AIM as having Heavy Armor added to the hull. If the AIM upgrade was just a non-DU composite improvement, the CBO would have used the term they already established for the IPM1. They switched terminology because the domestic AIM fleet received the Heavy Armor package, which the Federal Register defines by its radiation emission.
Exporting a downgraded version to Australia doesn’t change the budget audit or the NRC possession license for the domestic U.S. fleet. One is a restricted export model; the other is the domestic standard documented by the CBO and licensed by the NRC.
Yes im aware of this but like I said the AIM program was just a refresh of M1A1s in service, again to retrofit every M1A1 in service which was the plan (never happened) to AIMs to basically refresh the fleet would have cost astronomical amounts of money and an astronomical amount of DU even if we exclude the hull entirely.
So if they had plans to export the AIMs then they would have simply created a more simpler production method for the AIMs, knowing the fleet was already being phased out because the production of the M1A2 and M1A2 SEPs were in full production years ago.
So why siphon DU production to an already phased out vehicle fleet and why waste more money doing it when they could cut costs and put that cost saved to the M1A2s
It very is relevant, if they can’t install it into the hull. Then who does?
There is no other installer mentioned. There is no place at that time that holds a licence to install into the hulls.
5 of them.
I didn’t, the army only list 5.
It does, it means that no other hulls were created than the 5 they already had.
The M1A1 fleet was not phased out in 2000. It was the backbone of the armored force during the Iraq war, as the M1A2 was only available in much smaller numbers at the time. The AIM program was specifically designed to bring that massive fleet up to a modern standard so it could remain viable on the frontline.
DU is not a scarce resource that needs to be siphoned. It is a waste byproduct of nuclear fuel enrichment that the Department of Energy has in massive, hundred-thousand-ton stockpiles. It is actually cheaper for the military to use DU than it is to buy and manufacture the high-performance non-radioactive composites required for export versions. Using DU is effectively a cost-saving measure for the US government.
The idea that they would secretly cut costs by skipping a documented armor upgrade while telling the Congressional Budget Office they installed it is an assumption of massive budget fraud. The CBO audited the AIM program and recorded that Heavy Armor was added to the hull. These audits are based on actual procurement contracts and production work, not on guesses about supply chains.
Simplified production for Australia exists because ITAR and the Atomic Energy Act make exporting DU armor a criminal offense. US domestic production does not have that legal restriction. Using a legally mandated export downgrade to claim the US domestic fleet is also downgraded is ignoring how military export laws work. The budget audit says the armor was added, and the federal definition says that armor emits radiation. No amount of speculation about costs overrides the actual financial record of the work performed.
The General Dynamics license is a manufacturing and handling permit for a factory, while the Army license is the master record of what the government actually owns. General Dynamics doesn’t make the armor; the Federal Register explicitly says a Department of Energy contractor makes the packages and ships them to the plant. General Dynamics just installs those pre-made modules into the tanks.
The question of “who installs it” is simple: the workers at the Lima plant do. Just because their specific factory license focuses on turret work doesn’t mean they aren’t bolting pre-sealed armor packages into hulls.
The Army’s possession license is the final word on what is inside the vehicle. If the hulls were just steel or composite, they would be radiologically “cold” and the NRC would have no jurisdiction over them. But Item 9 of the Army license explicitly defines the hulls as depleted uranium armor components.
The budget audit from the CBO confirms the AIM fleet received the hull upgrade. The Federal Register confirms that the “Heavy Armor” upgrade emits radiation. The Army’s own license confirms the hull is a uranium component. Trying to use a contractor’s handling permit to ignore the legal inventory record of the tank’s owner doesn’t work. The Army wouldn’t subject themselves to nuclear regulations for a hull if the material wasn’t in there.
Didnt say the M1A1 fleet was phased out, I said the AIMs were being phased out because M1A2s were in full production, that much is clear from your own CBO report when they list vehicle numbers of the fleet.
Phased out is probs the wrong term here, but they had little intention of eventually upgrading every M1A1 to AIMs when M1A2s were more than likely taking up most of that production headroom, thats the M1A2 in terms of numbers out does the AIMs on this grapgh.
Spoiler
Not entirely, it costs them money to store DU, it costs money to maintain the areas that store DU, it costs money from organizations that handle it through contracts and licencing fees. the cost actually adds up overtime because of maintenance and handling and transportation costs. which a lot of can be reduced through non DU arrays being produced or using existing lines for existing arrays
The graph provided actually shows the M1A1 AIM expanding in the fleet from 2000 onwards. It was not being phased out; it was the primary modernization path for the thousands of existing M1A1 hulls that the Army could not afford to replace with brand-new M1A2s. The AIM program was specifically meant to keep the bulk of the fleet relevant for decades.
Regarding the cost of DU, the Department of Energy already pays to store and secure hundreds of thousands of tons of this material as a waste byproduct. Using it for armor is not a massive new expense; it is a way to utilize a raw metal that the US government already has in massive stockpiles. Developing and manufacturing the high-end ceramics needed for a non-DU export array is actually more expensive than using the DU surplus.
Speculating on why the Army might want to cut costs does not change what the Congressional Budget Office actually reported. The CBO audited the program and recorded that Heavy Armor was added to the hull. These are financial and inventory records based on real contracts. Claiming the Army skipped the upgrade to save money on a metal they have in surplus, while the documents state the work was done, is just a guess that contradicts the official record.
Item 9 in this 2016 NRC license is the exact authorization for installation. It permits the Use and storage of hulls as depleted uranium armor components. In NRC regulatory terms, Use refers to the operational employment of the material for its licensed purpose. A hull cannot be used as a DU armor component if the DU has not been installed.
The 5 tank limit you keep citing is not true. It does not exist on this license or the 2006 amendment that preceded it. The maximum amount is officially listed in Item 8 as As needed. The NRC would not authorize the unlimited use of hulls as radioactive components if they were just empty steel boxes.
The contractor handling license you posted covers factory tasks at Lima. This Army license covers the physical inventory of the fleet. Item 9 legally identifies the hull as a component that contains the uranium. That is the literal definition of installation for an armor package. The paperwork confirms the material is in the hulls and the limit on the number of those hulls has been gone for two decades.
Item 9 of license SUB-1536 is that authorization. It explicitly permits the Use and storage of hulls as depleted uranium armor components. In federal licensing, the term Use is the specific legal authorization for the material to be operational in its final assembled form. You cannot use a hull as a DU armor component if the material hasn’t been installed.
The contractor license you found for General Dynamics describes their specific shop floor handling tasks. The Army possession license defines the physical configuration of the fleet once the government takes delivery. By authorizing the Use of hulls as DU components in Item 9, the NRC is authorizing their integration into the vehicle.
The 5 tank limit was legally deleted from this license in 2006. Item 8 now authorizes possession As needed. There is no reason for a federal agency to remove a specific numeric limit and switch to unlimited authorization if the production was stopped at 5 tanks. The NRC removed the limit to cover the mass production fleet confirmed by the CBO audit. The documents show the limit is gone, the use is authorized for hulls, and the material is being utilized in the fleet. If you are waiting for a license that uses the word installation instead of the legal term Use, you are ignoring how federal possession and use statutes are actually written.
expanding? when the A2 portion is about 3x bigger than the AIM portion of the graph but notice how all productions basically dwindled around 2000-2003, I cannot get up to date figures but reality is, they clearly were reducing costs hence production across the A1/AIM/A2/A2SEP reduced significantly post 2000.
Who pays the DoE? government does. who issues budget changes? government does, just because the DoE pay the cost doesnt mean the cost is coming from elsewhere, do you think the DoE just produce there own money… no it comes from subsidies and government budget changes with each administration that comes along and wants to either increase or decrease it.
You also realise DU isnt purely used for armour or weapons right? just because they have a huge stockpile doesnt mean its all available for armour or weapons, a lot of it is also used to dilute enriched uranium from weapon programs and is also used in civil nuclear reactors because they dont use pure high enriched uranium, they use a mixed oxide or MOX fuel which to make that they need DU
The production graph dwindles after 2000 because the US stopped building brand-new hulls, not because they were cutting corners on the upgrades. Every AIM and SEP is a remanufactured tank. The AIM program was the only way to keep the thousands of M1A1s relevant during the Iraq war because they couldn’t afford to replace every single one with a brand-new M1A2.
Speculating about DU being used for MOX fuel or civil reactors is a reach. The MOX program in the US was a total failure and got cancelled years ago. The Department of Energy is currently sitting on over 700,000 metric tons of depleted uranium. It isn’t a rare or expensive material that needs to be siphoned; it is a waste byproduct they have to pay to store anyway. Using it for armor is literally the most cost-effective way to get high-density protection compared to buying expensive specialized ceramics for an export array.
The CBO audit from 2006 isn’t a theoretical plan. It is a record of what the government actually paid for and installed during that rebuild process. If the CBO says Heavy Armor was added to the hull, then the government signed the contracts and the work was done. Guessing about production headroom or handling costs 20 years later doesn’t change the official financial record of the fleet’s configuration.
Right and do you honestly think they would spend the money needed to convert all of these to DU hulls/turrets when they clearly needed to cut costs, hell if the main use for these was during Iraq they sure as hell knew adding DU to these would be redundant because they wouldn’t be facing anything of major concern in terms of firepower.
Do you see the picture now in why adding DU to what is basically a refresh fleet makes no sense.
No its not a reach, this was lifted in 2005 and the Nuclear Energy Association confirm that with public documents.
What you also dont see to grasp is the stockpile of DU the US have isnt all in the form needed to produce armour, the majority of there stockpile is in the form of DU Hexaflouride (DUHF) which costs money to deconvert, as of 2024 the Nuclear Energy Association claim the US have roughly 765000 tonnes of Hexaflouride stockpiled and this has to be converted if you want to use in other areas like armour and ammo
No it isn’t. It does not mention installation. it doesn’t even mention that they are allowed to possess the packages outside of the turrets and the 5 hulls. Only as part of them.
Correct, so who installs them?
correct.
No, they have not given authorization for handling the packages outside of the turrets and the 5 hulls. They have not authorized transport and storage of the packages. only as part of turrets and the 5 hulls.
No, point 13 and 17.
for security reasons.
No, absolutely not. Not even a little. You are completely impossible.
Condition 17 actually disproves your point. Read the very first sentence: Except as specifically provided otherwise in this license.
That is a legal override clause. It means that if a specific box in the license header says something different than the old letters, the license header wins.
Item 8 on the first page specifically provides the maximum amount as As Needed. Because the license itself provides this specific As Needed authorization, it legally overrides the 5 tank limit mentioned in the 2006 letter.
You are trying to use the fine print to ignore the primary authorization of the document. If the NRC wanted a 5-tank limit, they would have typed the number 5 in the Maximum Amount box. Instead, they deleted the number and wrote As Needed to account for a mass-produced fleet.
This matches exactly what your other source, the 2012 review, said on page 38: that the possession limits were removed because the number of tanks changes frequently and is now classified.
The number 5 is not a secret and it does not change frequently. You are using a 20-year-old note from a schoolhouse application to ignore the current legal reality. The Army is licensed for an unlimited, classified number of hulls. The CBO audit confirms they paid for those hulls. The 5 prototypes argument is over.
You are clearly getting emotional and resorting to one-word denials because the literal text of these documents contradicts your theory. I am not going to keep arguing with analogies about bikes and nails while you ignore federal law. I won’t respond again until you can explain why your own source says the inventory is a classified, frequently changing number if you honestly believe only 5 tanks exist. If you can’t explain that contradiction, you are just ignoring the evidence to protect an old decision.
