- Yes
- No
Introduction: The Nimrod MRA.4 was an upgrade to the MR.2 that was cancelled during the test phase and has been mired in controversy since. The cancellation of the program also coincided with the end of the MR.2’s service life, and thus the end of the Nimrod itself.
Importance of ASW: The Nimrod MR.2 was a workhorse of the RAF, flying everyday, at day or night or in bad weather conditions, in order to make sure that the maritime boundaries of the UK were not being compromised, that vessels were obeying UK laws, conducting SAR operations, and most importantly, keeping track of prowling Soviet submarines in the North Sea and Atlantic. Their importance to UK national safety was paramount: submarines were not only a threat to shipping, but also a threat to civilisation in general; a single submarine could carry numerous missiles, each of which could bring Armageddon to all of humanity. Hundreds of such types of submarines were in service with the Soviet Navy. Even with the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the Soviet Union, the job of the Nimrod was not over, with ex-Soviet diesel-electric submarines being proliferated around the globe. The “Mighty Hunter”, as the Nimrod was known, a name well-deserved, prowled over the ocean, with the safety of civilisation on its shoulders; a burden shared by all ASW types.
Development: However, by now the MR.2 began showing its age, and it was necessary for a new type to replace it. Design studies had been ongoing since the Seventies, as the MR.1 was deemed only a temporary solution. Many studies were conducted, including ones based off of the BAC 1-11 and VC10, however, it was decided to stick with the Nimrod, and upgrade it to MR.2 standard. However, by the late Eighties, it was deemed necessary to begin drawing up a replacement for the MR.2, that could enter service by the early-2000’s, when the MR.2 was expected to reach the end of its service life. So, in the period between 1989 and 1993, numerous design studies were conducted to find the ideal replacement for the Nimrod. The studies were wide ranging, with dedicated new-build ASW aircraft, powered by a wide variety of engines, ranging from turboprops, to turbofans and propfans, as well as conversions of airliners and transport aircraft. The latter had already been successful, with the Nimrod itself being a conversion of the Comet 4, and in other countries too: the P-3 Orion being a conversion of the L-188 Electra, and the Il-38 being a conversion of the Il-18 airliner. Other options were proposed, such as numerous modernised variants of the P-3 Orion (including the abortive P-7), and the Breguet Atlantique 3. Both of these options were dismissed by the Air Staff, as it was believed that a legacy turboprop aircraft would be a step backwards for the RAF, which had operated the jet-powered Nimrod successfully for nearly 30 years at this point. The conversion of airliners was considered to be a non-starter, as the Air Staff required four engines, and all modern airliners of the size and weight class necessary were twin-engined. A completely new aircraft, though the best option, was the one that was most risky, and expensive. The best solution came in the form of the BAE Woodford FIMA, which would eventually evolve into the A400M Atlas, after a long gestation period. However, it wouldn’t be for another two decades that this would enter service, so it was chosen to upgrade the Nimrod. At the time, it was seen as a great idea, since the Nimrod, and Comet before it, had long been familiar to BAE and the RAF, at least, in theory.
Description: The MRA.4 was essentially a complete rebuild of the MR.2, with new wings, engines, engine nacelles and avionics. The flight deck was completely brand new, with the latest technology, with the original cockpit being replaced by a glass cockpit, and observers getting new displays, with new ASW equipment. Parts of the tail had to be modified and strengthened in order to deal with the new avionics and with the changed aerodynamics that the new engines brought. The entire fuselage was re-lifted in order to extend its service life. With such a huge redesign of the aircraft, there were obviously going to be some problems. And there were many…
Arising Problems: Originally, the Nimrod 2000, as the MRA.4 was then known, was intended to be an upgrade, reengining and refurbishment of the Nimrod MR.2. Originally, Flight Refuelling Ltd (FRL) was to carry out the refurbishment. However, on inspection, it was found that the airframes were not “built to a common standard” and BAE took over their work, and the airframes were moved to Woodford. These differences occurred because the original Comet airframes, which the Nimrod was based on, were hand-built, and were each different in certain ways. Additionally, the jigs which were used to build the Nimrod MR.1 airframes had been stored outside for decades, and were beyond useable by now. There were also multiple flaws found in the wing, so these had to be completely rebuilt, although the original wing design was kept. A new fly-by-wire system had to be developed for the aircraft, which itself brought numerous development problems. Costs mounted as delays increased, while the order was constantly reduced, making the program less sustainable. The original order was reduced to eighteen in 2002, sixteen in 2004, twelve in 2006, and ultimately, nine in 2008. It was as if the situation for the MRA.4 couldn’t get any worse. But it did.
Though the MRA.4 was never involved in any accidents or incidents, its predecessor, the MR.2, was subject to intense scrutiny in the last five years of its service. There were two incidents that revealed certain flaws within the design, that would plague the MRA.4 program until its dying day. Since the aircraft was a conversion of older models, it inherited many of its flaws. These would have had to been fixed, adding further cost.
XW666 was a Nimrod R.1, a signals-intelligence variant of the Nimrod. On the 16th May, 1995, the aircraft was flying over the Moray Firth after some routine maintenance, when the No.4 engine suffered a catastrophic engine failure. This caused a turbine blade to puncture one of the fuel tanks, causing a major engine fire that threatened to burn through the wing. Flight Lieutenant Art Stacey managed to ditch the aircraft in the Moray Firth, with his skill allowing the aircraft to safely come down, with all seven crew members surviving, being picked up by a Sea King from RAF Lossiemouth. The subsequent Board of Inquiry suggested various improvements to the entire fleet, mainly the fitting out of equipment and structure that reduced the risk posed by fire and catastrophic engine failure, however, these were not undertaken.
XV230 was conducting a routine surveillance mission on the 6th of September, when a fire broke out on the aircraft after mid-air refuelling. The aircraft succumbed to the flames and exploded, taking with it the lives of twelve RAF personnel, a Royal Marine and a British Army soldier. The crash was the biggest loss of service personnel in combat since the Falklands War. An investigation, and subsequent inquiry revealed damning evidence of design flaws and safety breaches spanning forty years. The Coroner’s report stated that the Nimrod was “not airworthy” and had not been since the IFR probes were fitted in the 1980’s. An independent review under Charles Haddon-Cave QC was highly critical of those involved in the Nimrod programme, and revealed numerous faults, three of which in particular, these being:
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A cross-feed duct installed on the original MR.1 build that fed air from the APU to the engines was found to be a “major source of ignition.”
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The MR.2 upgrade added a Supplementary [air] Conditioning Pack “which increased potential for ignition”
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The post-Falklands installation of the in-flight refuelling probe, which greatly “increased the risk of an uncontained escape of fuel”
The report was also critical of the Nimrod’s safety case. A safety case is basically a structured argument that is supported by evidence, that a system is able to function safely in a given environment. Haddon-Cave was also critical of how the RAF and MoD had handled “legacy” aircraft, as funds had not been properly allocated for the proper maintenance and inspection of these aircraft, essentially stating that penny-pinching was put above the safety of personnel. Finally, he was also critical about the RAF and MoD not holding up their part of the Military Covenant. The Military Covenant is essentially an informal agreement whereby the Armed Services provide for the needs of personnel are addressed to. Though having no basis whatsoever in British law, the Military Covenant has acquired pseudo-legal status in the years following 2001. This damning report clearly showed that the writing was on the wall for the Nimrod.
Cancellation: With mounting delays, an economic crisis, and safety concerns regarding the fleet, the MRA.4 was cancelled in the 2010 Defence Review, and the airframes cut up for scrap. The program has been a controversial topic ever since, and has been the source for numerous arguments and debates ever since. The aircraft itself and those who worked on it were not, and are not, to blame for the failure of the program, it was the procurement system in which it was ordered. The aircraft failed because the procurement process failed. The aircraft should not have been built in the first place. It was going to be riddled with flaws, delays and problems from the outset, and an effort to save money by using what was in place turned out to be another case of billions of pounds being flushed down the toilet, for want of a better expression. In essence, the project was dead before conception. Those who worked on the program did as best as they could to rectify the issues, and work with what they had. The Nimrod MR.2 fleet was also retired, with some being preserved, with the rest meeting the same fate as their MRA.4 cousins; the blowtorch and cutter of the scrapper. The “Mighty Hunter” had been laid to rest.
Performance:
| First Flight: | 26th August, 2004 |
|---|---|
| Crew: | 10 |
| Powerplant: | 4x Rolls-Royce BR.710 |
| Max. Speed | 496 kt |
| Service Ceiling: | 42,000 ft |
| Range: | 6910 nm |
| Empty Weight: | 102,515 lb |
| MTOW: | 232,315 lb |
| Wing Span: | 127 ft |
| Wing Area: | 2,538 sq ft |
| Length: | 126ft 9in |
| Height: | 31 ft |
| Production: | 9 ordered (all conversions from MR.2) |
5 completed (all scrapped)|
Weaponry:
- AIM-9L Sidewinder
- ASRAAM
- Storm Shadow
- AGM-84 Harpoon
- ALARM
- Stingray torpedoes
- Dumb bombs
- Paveway guided bombs
Conclusion: I believe that this would make for an interesting addition to the game due to the fact that this aircraft is unique, both from a historical perspective, and from the viewpoint of playstyle.
Sources:
https://www.baesystems.com/en/heritage/hawker-siddeley-nimrod
http://aviadejavu.ru/Site/Crafts/Craft20279.htm
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/aldrich/vigilant/lectures/gchq/xw666/
http://aviadejavu.ru/Site/Crafts/Craft20279.htm
“Nimrod’s Genesis: RAF Maritime Patrol Projects and Weapons since 1945 ” by Chris Gibson
