So why does the Tandem AGM-111K have improved penetration capabilities in comparison to the basic AGM-114B, even though the main charges are similar. An 100mm flat bonus to penetration would be significant for the TOW-2B.
The problem is that at least for now you have two (Three) categories for size, Standard & Large, which was intended to offset the fact that systems of Soviet origin tended to carry large volume, low quantity flares(mostly because they used less advanced formulations, and had different requirements and developmental methods), and so were put the at a distinct disadvantage during the period where flare performance was generic. (The Small class does the inverse and directly impacts LAU-138’s performance)
Then we have Western flares that fall into four separate form factors ; BOL-IR (2 x 3 x 1/4"), M206(1 x 1 x 4 or x 8"), MJU-7 (1 x 2 x 4 or x 8") and MJU-10 ( 2 x 2 x 8").
Of course with the two sperate categories, you come across the issue of why would you use the MJU-17 Flare bucket, when it only provides space for 6 countermeasures (Jammers are not implemented so it lacks one of its distinct advantages of the larger cartridges), when you could use the MJU-12 and have space 15 instead with the same performance (IRL the decision depends on expected threat, variant of countermeasure available, mission profile, and airframe), as the MJU-11, -12 & -17 Countermeasure magazines all fit in the standard form factor of the modern ALE-40 /-45 /-47 dispensers.
If had any input what I would probably do to rebalance things is also implement the covert nature (no report in the visual spectrum) of BOL-IR / ( & M221 countermeasure flare) to offset their worse performance and so make them more effective when being used pre-emptively (a further boost to their impact could be had if the FOV indicator was hidden, though the Gimbal limit indicator can remain as a guide).
They obviously don’t have a single team, and much of the work tasks can if properly planned be pipelined to increase throughput significantly.
This is the bit that I just don’t understand why you cling to it as being being of critical importance.
Much of what we have for countermeasures is abstracted (due to their nature, and also the potential for some systems to be held in war reserve) so its unlikely to be possible to prove its use for All Tech trees or at least the entirely of top tier (If we’re going to that level of granularity, and it would not be the first time a report is rejected due to game balance concerns) and so I don’t see why some level of handwaving in not practical, since the intent is to provide many additional nations’ helicopters some access to F&F ordnance and so allow balance to be had since more advanced ordnance is still a ways off (systems like the AGM-179 or LMUR missiles that would allow for an extended engagement range of more advanced SAM threats and so not completely write of helicopters after a point).
As proof that they do exist and entered service you have the US’s 66mm (IR/MMW) M81 obscurant smoke grenade;
The advanced development program for the M81 grenade was conducted from 1987 to 1992. In the transition to full scale development, the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) required the grenade to provide IR and MM instead of just MM protection The Grenade, Launcher, Smoke: Millimeter/Infrared (MM/IR) Screening, M81 was type classified in 1995 and is scheduled to begin production in 1998.
See above, there are systems that would defeat it available in a similar time frame.
In part at best, much of what would be needed could be reused with minor modification of existing systems to reach an acceptable level of granularity. It would be far less work than an entirely new bespoke system since much of the planning, hard work and implementation has already been done.
