Hu u were right
Yeah. I’m still going to find a way to show the text in clear but that’s probably going to mean typing it out myself
Vehicles like this are perfect for event rewards so the normal TT can actually be filled with proper in service vehicles
Nooooooooooo!!!
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I mean all tts have none service vehicles my fella
Mad respect for actually following through my man, ill see about changing the title when i get a chance
Ill probably keep the P.1154 name as well since thats what it is known as by many, but ill add in HS.1154
2 Likes
I suggest just changing the name to HS.1154 but also explain the name change and why it was changed (it says in the book, but not sure how well one can read it). In the suggestions list for British aircraft it will likely stay the same
I’ll punch it out when the other half heads off to work, dw yourself about it
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Couldn’t read all of it, so I’ve put “<unknown>” where I couldn’t figure out the right word, Some words I wasn’t entirely sure on so I’ve put them in <> to signify them. Was only really an issue on the first page.
There where some weird spellings that I’m just chalking up to the age of the text, left them in for posterity. Apologies if I’ve inserted any spelling mistakes or changes. I’ve compared them and can’t see anything, but uh, I’m dyslexic, did check it over with spell check, but again apologies if I’ve made any mistakes.
Now if you’ll excuse me I’ve got to nip to the shops to get something the last bits for curry. Hope this is good enough
Whole lotta text
In the eyes of the air force professionals the world over, the P.1127 was a problem aeroplane. Its ability to take off from a field or a length of country road was useful, but its flight performance seemed an anachronism. Since 1950, hardly any major air force had written a combat aircraft specification that did not demand supersonic performance, and few envisaged the continued use of subsonic aircraft in the front line; the exceptions were a couple of naval attack aircraft, and the illuminating experiences of Vietnam were a few years off.
The Royal Air Force was in an unusual position, in that it was in theory being phased out of the manned-aircraft era, at least as far as its traditional primary roles of strategic defence and attack were concerned. Possibly for this reason, the service’s less glamourous job of supporting ground forces - in the late 1950s, the task of Camm’s tough and tractable Hunter - received a little more attention than usual, and as early as 1959 the P.1127 was being seen as a potential replacement for its stablemate. Operational Requirement 345 was issued to cover a developed V/Stol design, with at least 18,000 lb of thrust and a useful warload. But OR345 soon became bogged in controversy between the advocates of a simple, near-term P.1127 development and those who were more interested in high-supersonic aircraft. The problem was that the basic P.1127 was firmly subsonic in level fight, although it could be and was dived past Mach 1. But at speeds, the slow and cool fan flow from the front <unknown> became steadily more inefficient; the bulk of the engine and the front nozzles made for poor transonic aerodynamics and, finally, the big blunt-lipped inlets generated tremendous drag. On the other hand, Rolls-Royce was sketching <unknown> supersonic V/Stol aircraft with multiple lift engines arranged longitudinally in a slender fuselage and dedicated supersonic powerplants for cruise; eventually, these ideas were to see fruition in the Dassault Mirage III-V.
Bristol’s answer, devised in 1960, was to increase the thrust of the Pegasus, particularly at high speed, by the development of a new form of reheat known as plenum chamber burning (PCB). The core flow was left alone, but two specially designed burners were installed behind the fan, each located inboard of a new variable-area nozzle. Bristol was helped in its development of PCB by its very advanced ramjet technology, which likewise involved the problem of maintaining stable and efficient combustion in a relatively low-pressure, low-temperature airstream. PCB, it was soon appreciated, had some remarkable advantages. A conventional reheat system, operating in a 1,200°F exhaust stream, can barely manage a twofold increase in gas temperature and is thus not very efficient. PCB, working in the 200-210°F fan stream, can create a tenfold temperature rise. Even using just over half the air that goes into the engine, PCB can sustain a very high proportional power boost, or can offer a lower boost with much better efficiency than conventional reheat.
Just as important for the P.1127 layout, PCB supplies extra thrust to the front nozzles in the vertical mode, shifting the balance point forwards, so it is possible to lengthen the forward fuselage of the aircraft, making room for longer inlet ducts - easier to design for supersonic speeds - and a longer, more aerodynamic forward fuselage. On the debit side, PCB adds complication, and dramatically worsens problems of ground heating, erosion and heat recirculation.
Bristol moved ahead quickly with PCB, running the first system on a development Pegasus 2 in late 1962: the engine was bench-tested upside-down, blasting columns of flame vertically skywards. Meanwhile, in 1960, Camm proposed the Mach 1.3 P.1150 to the RAF, based on a single PCB Pegasus 5, and with a longer body and a thinner wing than the P.1127. The P.1150 also typified another advantage of PCB: a larger aircraft could be built using the same basic powerplant, blunting the common criticism that the range and payload of the P.1127 were penalized by an oversized engine in the cruise.
The low-supersonic P.1150, however, was never the subject of an official requirement. In the following year, two years of deliberations at the Brussels headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization resulted in the issue of Nato Basic Military Requirement 3 (NBMR.3) covering an advanced V/Stol tactical strike fighter. For the first time, the plan suggested, an aircraft would be chosen by Nato for all its members from the best they had to offer. The fact that there was no means for Nato to compel its members to buy the chosen aircraft was conveniently overlooked, but in the continued absence of a firm requirement for an operational V/Stol aircraft the only answer was to play NBMR.3 <unknown, ends in -ously> as possible.
Nato wanted an aircraft to deliver a 2,200 lb nuclear <device?> on a 250 nm low-level Vtol strike mission flown at Mach 0.92, with at least Mach 1.5 maximum speed at altitude. The range requirement could not be met within the vertical take off weight of the P.1150 - which had about 24,000 lb <unknown> thrust - and for a time Hawker explored a partnership with Germany on the P.1152, with a stretched fuselage and two Rolls-Royce lift jets, one in front of and one behind the Pegasus. This, however, was judged too complex, and too inflexible - its weight would have given it a poor thrust/weight ratio on non-PCB power, and low-level flight would have been its limit.
January 1962 was the deadline for NBMR.3 proposals: the final Hawker-Bristol submission was the completely new P.1154, closely resembling the P.1150 but much larger and heavier, and powered by an entirely new engine. This was the BS.100, roughly 50 percent bigger than the Pegasus and using some high-pressure components from the Olympus. In April 1962, the P.1154 was declared technical winner of the NBMR.3 contest, while the Dassault Mirage III-V was classified as “of equal merit". This formula was an unsuccessful attempt to placate the French. Almost immediately, the concept of unified Nato evaluation and purchasing exploded like an over-ambitious bullfrog, and was laid to rest with “It seemed like a good idea at the time” chiselled into its tombstone.
Another tiny grave nearby held another policy which had died in infancy: the decree against manned fighters in the 1957 British Defence White Paper. It was now accepted by the Ministry of Defence - no longer headed by “Mr Missile,” Duncan Sandys - that the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy needed new manned combat aircraft. The RAF wanted a new tactical strike/reconnaissance aircraft as a flexible, fast-responding and cheaper running-mate to the long-range, all-weather TSR.2, while the Navy needed a supersonic all-weather interceptor. America’s Department of Defence was saving money by combining two similar requirements in the shape of the TFX programme (or so it seemed at the time); the British MoD decided to do the same, and the P.1154 was the obvious aircraft to use.
The RN was hostile to the idea from the outset. Its experience with adapted land-based fighters had been unhappy, on the whole, and it was envious of the excellent aircraft deployed aboard the US Navy’s carriers. The basic terms of its requirement - high supersonic speed, a heavy armament of radar-guided missiles, two seats and a powerful radar - could have been, and probably were, written around the McDonnell Phantom II. No vectored-thrust V/Stol was operated on to or off a carrier until February 1963. Even after Bill Bedford demonstrated that the P.1127 could operate from a carrier without catapult or arrester gear, the RN refused to believe this could be done in service and insisted on catapult/ arrester features in its new fighter, an immense cost in weight. Neither did the RN like the idea of a single engine.
The RAF, by contrast, was keen to have the P.1154 in a more basic form, even being willing to relax the requirement on high supersonic speed in the interests of simplifying the inlet design (the P.1154 would still have attained Mach 1.9-plus). Definition went ahead quickly. The P.1154 was to have extensive avionics for low-level strike in Europe, comprising a multimode attack radar from Ferranti - including automatic terrain-following - one of the first head-up dis-plays, developed by Specto, and an advanced Ferranti navigation system. Designated FE541, this was based on a full inertial platform and drove a moving-map display which dominated the cockpit and gave the pilot an exact position fix at all times. The powerplant would be a single BS.100/8 with PCB.
Insistence on commonality and the Navy’s lack of enthusiasm continued to delay the project. Catapult provisions - including a wing-pod-mounted tricycle-type main gear in some versions - crew stations, different avionics and weapons, and different intakes conspired to make the two versions almost two separate designs. Rolls-Royce saw an opening and offered the Navy a different powerplant with two POB Spey engines, suggesting that the BS.100 could well drop behind schedule and that the twin engines would offer greater safety. (The hot jet pipes from the engine cores were crossed to reduce asymmetric problems with one engine out. John Fozard at Hawker scornfully described the layout as “a lot of hot knitting.”) The Rolls-Royce proposal was ruled out by the MoD on the grounds of inadequate commonality, and RR switched its efforts behind a Spey-powered version of the Phantom II.
It was October 1963 before the Gordian knot was cut; full development of the RAF aircraft was ordered and that of the Navy aircraft was delayed. The RN had decided that its combat air patrol mission could only be met by the P.1154 if it used catapult launching, and saw the go-ahead for the RAF version as the green light to start open negotiations on the Spey Phantom.
Work continued on the RAF aircraft, now re-designated HS.1154 after the Hawker Siddeley group’s unsentimental decision to eliminate some of the oldest names in the British industry. (The change in designations never really stuck on the P.1127.) The first aircraft was expected to fly in 1966 and service entry was scheduled for 1969-70. Development of the BS.100 continued; a Pegasus with PCB had run in late 1962, and several hundred hours of PCB running had been accomplished by the time the BS, 100 made its first bench run in October 1964. The name Harrier - a hovering bird of prey, like the Kestrel - had been chosen for the production aircraft, and the RAF needed about 150 of the type.
These plans were not to see fruition. In October 1964, 13 years of Conservative Party rule came to an end, and Harold Wilson’s Labour team came to office with a commitment to shift money from defence to social policy. Three advanced aircraft - the HS.1154, the TSR.2 and the HS.681 Stol transport - were under development, their timescales spread over only two or three years, and promised a huge peak in research, development and acquisition costs in the latter half of the 1960s. The Labour government scrapped them all. Little noticed at the time, though, was that Hawker’s V/Stol activities were not halted. A couple of weeks after the HS.1154 was cancelled, Hawker received a contract to proceed with a service-type version of the Kestrel, under the designation P.1127 (RAF).
Fifteen years after the axe fell on the HS.1154, John Fozard looked back on the project and noted the major difficulties with ground erosion, heating and recirculation that the supersonic aircraft would have presented. “We’d have made it work,” he said, “but today we’d have a different attitude to V/Stol, with more operational constraints.” The HS.1154 would have needed heat proof concrete - not just an ordinary road surface - and would thus have been tied to prepared sites. The aircraft which pioneered the modern view of V/Stol operations is the aircraft ordered by the much maligned Wilson administration in February 1965, and which, two years later, inherited the name Harrier from its cancelled predecessor.
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I doubt they will ever add HS.1154 but if they did its performance would be insane.
I would want them to add the bigger winged one
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Where’s the two Spey… WHAT THE FUCK?
You’ve never heard of that?
The spey engined one was just proposed iirc, the actual RN variant would have had the BS.100 like the JS
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I want to read the text to also correct things but I’m too lazy to do it rn
Will do it soon though
I’m not British and even I am furious about how the UK government handled its aviation industry, shame we most likely won’t see its wasted potential even in war thunder