In the late war (1943+) Germany had a focus on producing Panther tanks, with Tiger tanks being a secondary focus for more elite or specialized groups but recently i’ve been asking myself a few questions about that. Late war tank designs from Germany seem to focus on armor instead of the famous german engineering that made their tanks so notorious in the first place (looking at you maus) If the war had dragged on any longer, even just a few months, the heavy tanks coming out from the allied nations would’ve easily dealt with the Maus anyway.
The panther was a medium tank but its more of a heavy medium than a true medium tank, they were meant for long range engagements with a focus on armor which means it isn’t the most agile tank on the battlefield by a wide margin, this contrasts the german tanks in the early war during blitzkriegs. The panzers of the early war were lightly armored compared to panthers and tigers, they were very easy to produce and also effective in their role on the field, but by the late war the allies could easily deal with Panzer IVs even with their upgrades.
This makes me wonder, had the germans focused instead on making more expandable tanks compared to the Tiger and Panther would it have made a difference?
Something lighter than a Panther but can still penetrate and deflect shots in critical areas (once a thank is penetrated its usually out of action)
These tanks could support panthers and tigers making the heavier tanks anchors and the lighter mediums supports.
I envision something like a M4A3E8 or T-34-85, because the Pz IV was just too outdated to really compete with the late war mediums.
Or was Germany too weak past 1943 from the bombings and lost territory to really make a difference or even think about making another variant because of logistics?
By 1943, Germany had already shifted into a defensive war, unlike the early war when their doctrine was based on outmaneuvering their opponents. They needed bunkers on tracks more than mobility.
Pretty sure the Maus wasn’t going to be ready in those few months anyway. And imo, you don’t even need heavy tanks to counter it, the Allies would have just bombed the crap out of it before it even reached the front.
They did, that is exactly what the Stugs and Hetzers were for, and to some extent the Pz.4. But you have to understand that by that point in the war they had a shortage of everything: crews, oil, steel, aluminum, fuel… Adding more tank to the mix just increases the logistical cost with minor to negative improvements. Actually, by switching to that kind of doctrine with more vehicles, they might have lost the war even faster due to crew attrition.
That is technically what the Panther was supposed to be. The problem is, you can’t make something “lighter” that is still able to deflect shots from a 17 pdr, US 76mm, or Soviet 85mm.
The Panther was originally intended to be the 30t tank you are describing, but a certain painter wanted them to keep up armoring it. That is why ig, you see the VK 30.02 at ~35t while the Panther D is ~45t. If you want to bounce late war shells, the tank is going to get heavy.
It would have been a logistical nightmare to replace the Pz.4 production at that point. Retooling factories takes at least several months, and within that time Pz.4 production would have to stop completely. Germany didn’t have that kind of luxury. They did try to standardize with the E series, but that went nowhere because the war ended.
The problem was never the production number of certain hardware, it was always a matter of available fuel to train crews and to operate them in an offensive role.
So these debates regarding quality vs quantity approaches or discussions about doctrines are usually pointless as a war of attrition boils down to available resources and the willingness to use them.
The war was lost for Germany late 1942/early 1943 as they failed to conquer the oil wells in the Caucasus in 1942. This might have opened a window for a separate peace agreement with the USSR as their breadbasket Ukraine was occupied and the USSR had severe issues to feed and fuel their Army and their citizens.
The US supplies (fuel and food) helped the USSR through their very critical phases and were not an act of friendship - the US was fully aware that Germany could not be defeated without the Red Army.
The Teheran Conference in Early 1943 simply acknowledged that the war was won and announced the goal for an unconditional surrender of Germany - which was more or less solely aimed to avoid a negotiated peace deal and to take out Germany as dominant force in central Europe.