Except all the secondary 4" ammo in the Hood’s secondary magazine was fixed (in shell casings) as well, not in charge bags, and that room clearly experienced a secondary high-order explosion of great violence, possibly after an initial fire or possibly nearly instantly. (Yes, shell walls on bigger shells are thicker.)
The tests on whether you can chain react shell explosions in the absence of an increase in ambient temperature that a fire would produce are not really on point here. That just proves the initial single detonation inside the shell room won’t by itself lead to the whole shell room exploding. But if it produces a fire that is heating up all the shells at the same time, you don’t need to have the capability to chain react for a large high-order event.
Moving those big shells around requires machinery, and machinery requires grease and oil, so there will be things that can catch fire, same as anywhere else on a ship. I would suggest the chances of a fire in a shell room leading to explosion are certainly not nil. Again, though, in real life it would require the crew literally having no ability to fight the fire or flood neighboring compartments in time for it to lead to ship loss, so examples are likely rare.
Hood is another example of the previous WWI-era design philosophy of putting the shell room below the waterline and the magazine above; I have read somewhere that that was because at the time a magazine explosion/fire was seen as less of a risk than one in the shell room. So clearly at the time people still thought there were some pros and cons here. I don’t know we can conclude they were wrong with absolute certainty. It seems there should be still be residual (but differential) risks to fires in both types of compartment.