Hebime

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About Hebime

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    The stealthy and mute tanker
  • Birthday 12/02/1987

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    Male
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    Hungary
  • Interests
    Ancient Rome, Medieval ages, WW1, WW2, strategic games (PC and tabletop), Warhammer 40k

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  1. A másik tippem az eredeti olasz pettyes álcafestés lenne ami a Magyar Királyi Légierő által használt Caproni Ca.310 Libeccio-kon is megtalálható, illetve Caproni Ca.135-ökön. Ebben viszont az az érdekes, hogy pl. a Ca.310-eken CSAK pettyes álcafestést látni, a Ca.135-ökön lehet pettyeset, hármas magyart, illetve teli zöldet is látni, míg a Ca.101-eken meg csak magyar hármast, de abból is van éles kontúros és hullámos verzió is. Ezért mondtam, hogy inkább a hármas magyar festés legyen, az mindig egy tuti tipp.
  2. Az elsődlegesen támadó feladatra szánt magyar légierő bombázó-gépparkjának fejlesztése a német Junkers Ju-86K-2 típusok mellett olasz forrásokból történt. Az először megrendelt kilenc darab FIAT BR.20 bombázó repülőgép két mintapéldánya a Repülő Kísérleti Intézetnél végzett kiértékelések során a Ju-86-nál lényegesen rosszabbnak mutatkozott, mire - a meggondolatlan vásárlást elkerülendő - a Honvédelmi Minisztérium a megrendelést törölte. Képet a két BR.20-ról nem fogsz találni, de mivel a Ju-86-okkal együtt tesztelték őket ezért majdnem 100%-ig biztos vagyok benne, hogy a hagyományos három színű magyar álcafestést kapták.
  3. @Kulcsos12. Cr.32 és Cr.32bis festésre felkészülni.
  4. Ne aggódj, a Csaba páncélkocsin is lövésálló Cordatic gumik voltak. Kis kaliberű fegyverrel nem sok kárt tudsz tenni benne.
  5. Hát, pár sebből vérzik, de alapvetően nem rossz. Pl. Ezek szerint a cikk írója nem volt képes figyelmesen elolvasni a forrásait. Köztudott, hogy a rohamtarack a II-es, a rohamágyú pedig az I-es.
  6. Not that much OT if you take a look at @ArmourWorm's post.
  7. Szerintem kicsit kicsik lettek a zöld és a barna foltok. Véleményem szerint lehetnének kicsit nagyobbak. Ha megnézed az archív képet akkor látszódik, hogy a T-040 (a "-" is hiányzik) felirat majdnem teljes egészében egy zöld színű folton van. Ez a két olyan magyar vonatkozású Panther képem amin még látszódik is a toronyszám. 223
  8. A német ágból kikerülnek az olasz gépek. Elvileg nem fog a helyükre más kerülni, át lesz szervezve egy kicsit a német TT.
  9. If all you are just reading the Allied Official Histories then, yes, one could get the impression that the Italians were a bunch of cowards. Contrary to popular myth, the Italian soldiers did not simply surrender when attacked during Operation Compass. Italian artillery gunners where well known for firing their guns to the death, often with the full knowledge that their shells could do no damage to the main British tanks. The Italian tankers and soldiers in these early battles, despite heavy British air attacks and naval fire, still moved out to engage British armour and supporting Australian infantry in the battles and were eventually crushed. And the Italian generals and colonels did not surrender until the situation proved untenable. Only with their artillery silenced, their tanks knocked out, and their surprise counterattacks checked, was it time for them to surrender. But then again, this happens in all armies. According to Australian reports at the time, many of the prisoners were weak from hunger and thirst at Bardia, and still they fought: "The impact of insufficient food and drink on the Italian defenders at Bardia was soon quite clear to the Australians ... many were dying and weak with hunger and thirst ... They went down on their knees and drank up puddles of water ... Warrant Officer R. Donovan, 2/21 Field Regiment was haunted by mass cries for 'aqua, aqua,' ... Some died of exhaustion and thirst."' (Bardia: Myth, Reality and the Heirs of Anzac, Craig Stockings, p. 316, UNSW Press, 2009 ) Despite the lack of food and water, an Italian battalion nearly overruns part of an Australian battalion, but this counterattack is repelled by the 2/6th Battalion. According to an Australian war correspondent, the Italian military battlefield surgeons and medics were dedicated professionals, and would soon win the admiration of the attackers. An Australian soldier claimed that one of the bravest men at Bardia proved to be an Italian combat medic: "We were so surprised when we first saw him, and before we realised ... we ceased fire. Followed by two stretcher-bearers, he walked calmly to where two of our men were lying wounded. He brought both men through our line, and attended to them, and then walked back and picked up two wounded Italians. I talked to him in French when he was with us. He said there was a brotherhood among doctors." The Australians later inflated the number of prisoners to nearly double the real number, with books in recent years making the exaggerated claim that 45,000 Italians were captured at Bardia. They later did the same at Tobruk, with Australain authors in recent years making the exaggerated claim that 30,000 Italians were captured in the Tobruk fighting. During General Erwin Rommel's First Desert Offensive, it was the Ariete Armoured Division and 8th Bersaglieri Regiment who formed the vanguard of the Afrika Korps, obtaining Rommel's first victory in North Africa with the capture of Mechili and 3,000 British Commonwealth troops on 8 April 1941. It was also the units of the Ariete, Trieste, Bologna, Brescia, Pavia and Trento Divisions that actually manned the actual seige lines around Tobruk, capturing 14 strongpoints along with 400 Australian soldiers in the night-fighting of 1 May and 16 May that seriously dented Australian morale, forcing General Leslie Morshead to accept defeat and have his division (suffering from PTSD and self-inflcted wounds) shipped out early (starting August) in 1941 to Syria. During Operations Brevity and Battleaxe in the summer of 1941, Italian soldiers under the command of fine officers (Colonel Ugo Montemurro and Major Leopoldo Pardi) stood and fought tanks with anti-tank guns, giving and taking losses and blunting the British armoured offensives. It was also the Ariete who defeated the British 7th "Desert Rats" Armoured Division at Bir el Gub, knocking out 40 Crusader tanks and derailing Operation Crusader. And it was Ariete who ploughed through the British-officered 3rd Indian Brigade, during Operation Venezia on 27 May 1942. While Rommel's panzers were pinned down nearby in the fighting for Tobruk, the Trieste breached a dense British minefield, all the while being bombarded by British artillery and aircraft, and saved the entire Afrika Korps from complete capitulation. The capture of the Mersa Matruh fortress in late June 1942 is often credited to the German 90th Light Division but the real damage was in fact done by the gunners of the Italian Brescia and Trento, who stuck to their guns despite the fierce British air attacks, and the Littorio Armoured Division who along with the 7th, 9th and 12th Bersaglieri Regiments overran 1,000 Gurkhas regrouping outside Mersa Matruh before surrounding and penetrating the British fortress, capturing another 6,500 POWs at bayonet point. The Bersaglieri, soon after shepherded into captivity another 1,000 demoralized New Zealander soldiers who had lost their way during the fighting. The main defences of the El Alamein front were formed by the Bologna, Pavia, Trieste, Trento, Sabratha and the Folgore Airborne Division backed up by the Ariete and Littorio Armoured Divisions and Bersaglieri Corps. As noted in "A Pint of Water Per Man" by US War Correspondent Harry Zinder from TIME magazine, it was the Italians who stubbornly manned the anti-tank guns during the Second Battle of El Alamein (destroying 70 British tanks from Brigadier John Cecil Currie's 9th Armoured Brigade at Tel el Aqqaqir) and it was the Italians who were betrayed in the final battle, with Rommel ordering the commandeering of trucks under gunpoint to evacuate the German forces. Italian troops were the main participants in the Tunisian Campaign and there were a number of experienced Bersaglieri battalions amongst the Afrika Korps assault formations at Kasserine Pass. They were in the thick of the fighting and along with the Centuaro Armoured Division obtained Rommel's last victory in driving back the US infantry (under Colonel Anderson Moore) and tanks (under Colonel Louis Hightower) along the mountain pass and Highway 13, with the Bersaglieri capturing 2,450 POWs in this action. As German morale crumbled in April and May 1943 and the entire Afrka Korps surrendered en masse, the Italian 1st Army under General Giovanni Messe kept on fighting, defeating the British 56th "Black Cat" Division and a Free French Division on 11 and 12 May. You can't find out about the important and courageous role played by the Italian divisions in the North Africa Campaign by reading the various Allied Official histories. You'll have to dig deeper. The Italians are coming? Yes, and they're going to blow your mind.
  10. They weren't poor soldiers per se. Their generalship was weak, and completely outclassed by the British in North Africa. However, a lot of other factors contributed to the crushing defeat at the beginning of that campaign. The Italians had no real military tradition, and their officer corps was not only spread thin but poorly trained. Their equipment was abysmal at the start of the war; their tanks and armored cars completely unreliable. Not only did they have a ghastly shortage of tanks; but the heaviest hitter they had at the start of that campaign was the M11/39, which was not only outgunned and outperformed by the British cruiser tanks, but also was designed in such a way that the main gun could basically only shoot forward. And the British already had the Matilda, whose armor literally could not be pierced by anything in the Italian arsenal at the time. Anyway, I digress. They had a shortage of tanks, which were already poor. The rest of the equipment was similarly torrid; the Italian industry base was small compared to the German or British one, and they simply could not keep up with the demands of a military that Mussolini saw conquering the entire Mediterranean. They were poorly equipped and poorly trained, which led to a few quick defeats at the hands of a vastly outnumber British force. Having been defeated in such a manner was obviously crushing to morale, so that compounded the problem. But, after the early disasters, Rommel arrived with German reinforcements, and Italy also sent more troops. Under the German command, Italian soldiers performed more than admirably, even when still supplied with updated yet thoroughly inferior equipment. This has been noted in memoirs of many Germans who fought alongside them, including Rommel, who has praised the Italians many times. Just on Wikiquote, there are two sourced quotes by Rommel on the quality of Italian soldiers. "Good soldiers, bad officers; however don't forget that without them we would not have any Civilization.", and about the Italian elite light infantry: "The German soldier has impressed the world, however the Italian Bersagliere soldier has impressed the German soldier." The lack of success for Italy's military can be attributed to just about everything except the quality of Italy's men. The same goes for the French defeat, where a fault of military doctrine has now placed a huge black mark on French military prowess for years to come. It's often frustrating to me when the world and history always places the fault on the quality of the men when it's almost always anything but. To put it as simply as possible, Italy was simply not prepared to actually fight an industrial war. Starting with Economics- Italy was a developing nation with a very young population, much like many middle-eastern nations are today; most under thirty, high unemployment, low level of development. Economically, it's coal and steel production were quite simply minuscule in comparison to Great Britain's, and even substantially less than Japan's production. I don't have figures handy but we're talking 1/10th the production here. At any rate, the Italians were quite capable of engineering marvelous weapons of war like the Littorio class battleships, and perfectly cromulent vehicles like the Carro P.40. But, further compounding Italy's economic hardships, it should be noted that Italy spent a rather substantial amount of money and material fighting the Spanish civil war. Some 40,000 volunteers were sent; fully armed and equipped courtesy of the armed forces. The Spanish civil war was disastrous for the Italian economy, and this would deeply hamper them in WWII. In relation to why they performed poorly in war, the limitations of Italian war-industry meant that for every Littorio, they were also making due with modernized WWI material; 5 out of the 8 battleships they had I can think of were WWI era vessels. In the air-power department, during the '30s the Italians were setting records for speeds and quite at the forefront of aviation. Italo Balbo's page on Wikipedia will give you an idea of how busy they were back then. While the Italians had forged ahead in the '30s, by the start of the war they had already fallen behind, and were equipped with obsolescent fighters from the start. Despite that, the Regia Aeronautica performed well in Africa initially, until the British deployed modern aircraft. It's tiny industry meant that it could not replace losses with modern aircraft in relevant numbers. On the ground, the Italians had a mixed bag of an average battle rifle, terrible heavy machine guns, excellent sub-machineguns, marvelous light artillery, and an excess of heavy artillery. The real nuts n' bolts though, the tanks. Well, the Italians had invested heavily in the tankette, which is a very small 1 or two man armored fighting vehicle. These tiny tanks were well within the means of Italy's industry to produce, but proved inadequate for the Spanish Civil War (at least by themselves.) Comando Superiori understood the limitations and had moved to correct it as best they could, with a handful of "medium" and light tanks (these would be considered very light by other nations) like the m39, the L41, etc. These tanks were of a mixed quality, and proved to be a poor match for enemy tanks like the Matilda. They were however, quite good for recce & raiding, it just shouldn't be a surprise that these glorified armored cars were ill-suited towards tank warfare. To further illustrate Italian industrial limitations, Italy only managed to equip two tank divisions, and those only with ultra-light tanks. Against all odds they still earned the respect of their enemies and the Germans. The next great hurdle for Italy is it's leadership- Keep in mind the bloated size of her military, and it's easy to see why it had such a mixed & always inadequate leadership; reservists had been called up for quite a while and military commands were saturated with non-professionals, blotting out the core of able leaders that exists in every army between a war. People often comment that it seemed like Italy didn't have good military theorists and few practitioners. It's not accurate, better to say that they lacked a concise view on how to move forward with theory, and that it didn't matter anyway because Italy lacked the means to see anything through. They understood the value of mobile warfare, but were quite simply unable to capitalize upon it with what they had, or could have. One area the Italians were actually pretty good at was logistics; they might have had next to no trucks, but they were well experienced with moving supplies to the men & guns, and knowing where they couldn't. This was a cause of aggravation for the Afrika Korps, as the Italians moved at what you could call a stately pace and could not capitalize on rapid tank advances.
  11. Nem tudom pontosan, de ha tippelnem kéne én is azt mondanám, hogy Héja II.
  12. Lesz benne magyar gép prémiumként.
  13.   Although not really a tank, but an IFV, it had this anti-tank variant which could be a Tier IV or Tier V light vehicle for the German branch.   Dimensions 5,56 x 2,54 x 1,85 m (18.2 x 8.3 x 6 fts)   Total weight, battle ready 14.6 tons (32,187 ibs)   Crew 3+5 (Driver, commander, gunner, 5 infantrymen)   Propulsion Rolls-Royce B81 Mk 80F 8-cyl gas. 220 hp (164 KW)   Suspension Independent torsion bars   Speed (road) 58 kph (36 mph)   Range 270 km (168 mi)   Armament Main : Rheinmetall (HS) 20 mm autocannon Sec. coaxial 7.62mm MG3 machine gun. Terc. 106 mm M40A1 recoilless rifle   Armor 30 mm front and sides (1.2 in)   Total production 2176 in 1958-71. http://www.panzerbaer.de/types/bw_spz_lg_hs30-a.htm   The 106 mm recoilless rifle had acces to HEAT, HESH and HE rounds and with the american HEAT round it could penetrate through 400 mm of armor. Furthermore it had the effective range of 1350 m so it won't be an only close-quarters vehicle.